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Abstract
Using mobile robots for autonomous patrolling of environments to prevent
intrusions is a topic of increasing practical relevance. One of the most chal-
lenging scientific issues is the problem of finding effective patrolling strategies
that, at each time point, determine the next moves of the patrollers in order
to maximize some objective function. In the very last years this problem
has been addressed in a game theoretical fashion, explicitly considering the
presence of an adversarial intruder. The general idea is that of modeling a
patrolling situation as a game, played by the patrollers and the intruder, and
of studying the equilibria of this game to derive effective patrolling strate-
gies. In this paper we present a game theoretical formal framework for the
determination of effective patrolling strategies that extends the previous pro-
posals appeared in the literature, by considering environments with arbitrary
topology and arbitrary preferences for the agents. The main original contri-
butions of this paper are the formulation of the patrolling game for generic
graph environments, an algorithm for finding a deterministic equilibrium
strategy, which is a fixed path through the vertices of the graph, and an
algorithm for finding a non-deterministic equilibrium strategy, which is a set
of probabilities for moving between adjacent vertices of the graph. Both the
algorithms are analytically studied and experimentally validated, to assess
their properties and efficiency.
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multiagent systems.
1. Introduction
A patrolling situation is characterized by one or more patrollers and by
some targets, located in an environment, that have to be patrolled in order to
prevent the entering of a possible intruder. Patrollers move in the environ-
ment according to a patrolling strategy that, at each time point, determines
their next action. One of the most interesting scientific issues is the deter-
mination of effective patrolling strategies for autonomous robotic patrollers,
namely, of strategies that drive the robots around environments to maximize
some objective function. Several objective functions can be defined according
to the specific patrolling situation, and works in literature can be approxi-
mately divided into two main classes. In the first one, the presence of the
adversary, i.e., the intruder, is not taken into account and the problem of
determining the optimal patrolling strategy comes down to the problem of
exploring or covering the environment. This problem can be formulated as
a classic decision theory problem where the objective function can be, for
instance, a coverage index or an entropy-based metric [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. In the
second class of works, the presence of an adversary is considered and the
problem is addressed in a game theoretical fashion [6, 7, 8, 9]. In this case,
the patrollers’ objective function to be maximized is their expected utility (in
the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern [10]) computed over the game
outcomes. The intruder is usually modeled as a rational agent that observes
the strategy of the patrollers and acts to maximize its expected utility. That
is, the intruder is assumed to be as strong as possible. Roughly speaking,
the contributions belonging to the first class come mostly from the mobile
robotic community, while the contributions belonging to the second class
come mostly from the multiagent community. Recently, it has been shown
that considering a model of the adversary can give the patrolling robots a
larger expected utility than the case in which the opponent is not modeled [6].
In this paper we present a formal framework for the determination of ef-
fective patrolling strategies that belongs to the class of game theoretical ap-
proaches. The proposed approach is based on the general idea of modeling a
patrolling situation as a game, played by the patrollers and the intruder, and
of studying the equilibria [10] of this game to derive the optimal patrolling
strategy. Now we survey the main related works, to set the background for
introducing in more detail our original contributions.
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1.1. Game Theoretical Patrolling Models for Mobile Robots
Game theoretical approaches model a patrolling situation as a non-cooperative
game [10] between the patrollers and the intruder. Two are the main ap-
proaches proposed in the literature for robotic patrolling with adversaries:
one does not explicitly model the preferences of the adversaries [7], whereas
the other one does [8, 9]. Before reviewing these approaches, we note that
similar strategic problems have been addressed in the pursuit-evasion field
(e.g., [11, 12]) and by hide-and-seek approaches [13], where a hider can hide
itself in a vertex of an arbitrary graph and a seeker can move along the graph
to seek the hider within a finite time. However, some assumptions, including
the fact that the evader’s goal is only to avoid capture and not to enter an
area of interest, make the pursuit-evasion problem not directly comparable
with the patrolling problem we are considering.
We now describe the main approach that does not model the intruder pref-
erences. In [7], the authors consider the problem of patrolling a perimeter
divided in cells, each one giving access to an area of interest, by employing a
team of synchronized mobile robots acting in turns. The perimeter is consid-
ered as a ring whose cells require the same time, say d turns, to the intruder
for entering. The robots keep an evenly separated formation by moving in a
coordinated fashion. (The authors show that this patrolling configuration is
optimal for their settings.) The patrolling strategy does not depend on the
specific cells in which the robots are. The authors present different movement
models for the robots. In the simplest one, all the robots move clockwise with
probability p or move counterclockwise with probability 1 − p. In the most
realistic movement model, all the patrollers move to the cells they are headed
to with probability p and reverse their heading, staying in their current cells
for a turn, with probability 1 − p. The intruder is assumed to be in the
position to repeatedly observe the actions of the patroller (staying hidden),
derive a correct belief over the patroller’s strategy, and attack the cell for
which the probability to be captured is the smallest one (this is because no
preferences over the cells are considered). The optimal patrolling strategy
amounts to choose the value of p that maximizes the minimum expected
utility for the patrollers or, equivalently, that max-minimizes the detection
probability. Two interesting extensions to this work are worth citing. In [14],
the authors study the impact of the intruder’s knowledge on the performance
of the patrolling strategy (e.g., when the intruder has zero or partial knowl-
edge over the patroller’s strategy). In [15], the authors study the impact of
uncertainty over the sensed data. These works present two main limitations.
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First, they are applicable only to very special ring-like environments where
all the cells have the same penetration time and the patrollers have no pref-
erences over the cells. Second, the strategy they produce is optimal only
when the intruder has no preferences over the cells. The work we present
in this paper overcomes these limitations by considering arbitrary topologies
and preferences for patroller and intruder.
We now turn to describe the main approach that explicitly models the
intruder’s preferences. In [9], the authors deal with the problem of patrolling
n areas by using a single robotic patroller such that the number of turns it
would spend to patrol all the areas is strictly larger than time d needed by
the intruder to enter an area. They model such a problem as a two-player
(i.e., the patroller and the intruder) strategic-form game with incomplete in-
formation (i.e., the intruder’s preferences over the areas can be uncertain to
the patroller) [10]. The actions available to the patroller are all the possible
routes of n areas, while the intruder chooses a single area to enter. The
intruder is assumed to be in the position to repeatedly observe the actions
of the patroller (staying hidden), derive a correct belief over the patroller’s
strategy, and find its best response to the patroller’s strategy. The appro-
priate equilibrium concept, in which the patroller maximizes its expected
utility, is the leader-follower equilibrium [16]. (A slight variation of this ap-
proach has been applied to the problem of patrolling n access points with
m < n static checkpoints at the Los Angeles International Airport [17].) As
discussed in [18], the approach in [9] presents two drawbacks. First, no topol-
ogy connecting the areas is considered and therefore it can hardly be applied
to real-world patrolling settings, where areas are usually connected by intri-
cate topologies and the patroller cannot move between any two areas in a
single turn. Second, if the decisions of the patroller are over the next route to
patrol (instead of over the next area), the intruder can increase its expected
utility by waiting, observing the patroller’s actions, and then choosing the
turn in which to enter. The work we present in this paper eliminates these
drawbacks, by considering settings with arbitrary topologies and allowing
the patroller to decide over the next area to patrol.
1.2. Main Original Contributions
We present an approach to robotic patrolling that is more general than
the game theoretical approaches discussed above, since it deals with environ-
ments with arbitrary topology and with arbitrary preferences for the agents.
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In particular, the main original contributions of this paper can be summa-
rized as follows.
• We formulate the patrolling problem as a game played by the patroller
and an intruder in an environment described as a graph. In this setting,
the patrolling strategy amounts to determine the vertex the patroller
should visit next. Assuming that the intruder can observe the patroller
for an indefinitely long time, the optimal patrolling strategy is found
by calculating the leader-follower equilibrium of the game.
• We propose an algorithm to find a deterministic equilibrium strategy,
which consists in a fixed path through the vertices of the graph such
that, when the patroller follows it, attempting an intrusion is not the
best action for a rational intruder.
• We propose an algorithm to find a non-deterministic equilibrium strat-
egy, which consists in a set of probabilities for moving between adjacent
vertices of the graph such that, when the patroller follows it, its ex-
pected utility is maximized.
Both the algorithms are analytically studied and experimentally validated,
to assess their properties and efficiency. We explicitly note that some pre-
liminary results about the algorithms for finding the deterministic and non-
deterministic equilibrium strategies have been reported in [19] and in [20, 21,
22, 23], respectively.
1.3. Structure of the Paper
In the next section we formulate the problem and we overview the main
results presented in the rest of the paper. In Sections 3 and 4 we present
the algorithms for finding the deterministic and the non-deterministic equi-
librium strategies, respectively. Both these sections have a similar structure,
presenting the specific state of the art, introducing the proposed algorithms,
analyzing them theoretically, and validating them experimentally. Section 5
discusses some extensions to our framework in order to capture more realistic
aspects and to improve its efficiency. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Problem Formulation and Overview of the Main Results
In this section, we formalize the patrolling setting we study (Section 2.1),
we present our game model (Section 2.2), we discuss the appropriate solution
6
concept (Section 2.3), and we summarize the main results we provide in this
paper (Section 2.4).
2.1. Patrolling Setting
We study settings that are characterized by the following features:
• the environment is represented by a directed graph (as in [7]);
• there is a single patrolling robot equipped with sensors (e.g., a camera)
able to detect intruders (as in [8, 9]);
• the intruder can perfectly observe the patroller’s strategy before acting
and derive a correct belief over it (as in [7, 9]);
• time is discretized in turns (as in [7, 9]);
• the intruder enters in vertices and cannot do anything else for some
turns once it has attempted to enter a vertex (this amounts to say that
penetration takes some turns to be completed, as in [7, 9]);
• the patroller and the intruder are assumed to be rational agents (as
in [8, 9]).
The patrolling setting is described by a direct graph G = (V,A, T, v, d).
V is a set of n vertices to be patrolled. A is the set of arcs connecting
the vertices. We often represent A by a function a : V × V → {0, 1},
where a(i, j) = 1 means that there exists an arc directed from vertex i
to vertex j and a(i, j) = 0 means that there is not. Given a vertex i, a
vertex j is adjacent to i if a(i, j) = 1. T ⊆ V contains the vertices that have
some value for both the patroller and the intruder. We call these vertices
targets. In practical applications, a target may represent an access point
to an area with some value (e.g., a door, as in [7]) or an area with some
value (e.g., an house, as in [9]). Vertices that are not targets (in V \ T ) are
part of paths that the patroller traverses to move between targets. v is a
pair of functions {vp, vi} where vp : T → R assigns each target a value for
the patroller and vi : T → R assigns each target a value for the intruder.
Patroller and intruder can assign different values to the same target. The
function d : T → N \ {0} assigns each target a time interval (measured in
turns) that the intruder must spend to successfully enter it. We call d(i) the
intruder’s penetration time for target i. We discuss in Section 5 how we can
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deal with situations wherein the values of d( · ) and vi( · ) are uncertain. An
example of a patrolling setting captured by our model is shown in Figure 1.
The bold numbers identify the vertices; arcs are depicted as arrows; the set
of targets is T = {06, 08, 12, 14, 18}; the values reported in target i are d(i)
and (vp(i), vi(i)). The graph representation of an environment can be derived
from a grid map of the environment, for example as discussed in [24]. The
graph of Figure 1 can represent the grid environment of Figure 2, where
every white cell of the grid corresponds to a node in the graph (black cells
are obstacles). In the following, we complete the description of our setting
by introducing sensing and action capabilities of the patroller and of the
intruder.
01 02 03
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d(06) = 9
(.1,.6)
07
08
d(08) = 8
(.3,.8)
09
10 11
12
d(12) = 9
(.1,.2)
13
14
d(14) = 9
(.2,.7)
15
16 17
18
d(18) = 8
(.3,.6)
19 20
21 22 23 24 25
26 27 28 29
Figure 1: The graph representing the patrolling setting used as running example.
The sensing capabilities of the patroller are defined by a function S :
V × V → [0, 1] where S(i, j) is the probability with which the patroller,
given that its current vertex is i, detects an intruder that is in vertex j. In
Sections 3 and 4, we assume that the patroller can sense only its current
vertex without any uncertainty. Formally, we assume that S(i, j) = 1 only
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Figure 2: Grid map of the environment corresponding to the graph of Figure 1.
if i = j, and S(i, j) = 0 otherwise. In Section 5 we discuss how our results can
be extended to the general case in which patroller’s perceptions are described
by a generic S( · , · ). When the patroller detects the intruder, we say also
that the patroller captures the intruder. The intruder is in the position
to observe the movements of the patroller along the graph and to derive a
correct belief over the patroller’s strategy. That is, the intruder knows the
patroller’s strategy before acting. In Section 5 we discuss how our results
can be extended to the case in which the intruder cannot perfectly observe
the environment before acting.
Time is discretized in turns and k ∈ N denotes a turn. We assume a simple
movement model for the patroller: it spends one turn to move between two
adjacent vertices in G and patrol the arrival vertex. As in [7, 8], we assume
that the intruder is able to appear directly in a target when it decides to enter
and to disappear directly from the entered target. We recall that, when an
intrusion is attempted in target t, the intruder stays there and cannot do
anything else for d(t) turns. During these turns the intruder can be detected
(captured) by the patroller. We discuss in Section 5 how the above model can
be extended to situations in which the intruder reaches targets by moving
along paths and there is a delay between the turn at which the intruder
makes the decision to enter a target and the turn at which it actually enters.
2.2. Game Model
The game model we employ to capture a patrolling problem belongs to
the class of two-player extensive-form games with imperfect information. In
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particular, we use a two-player dynamic repeated game [10], where the play-
ers are the patroller agent and the intruder agent. (The game can be rep-
resented also as a partially-observable stochastic game with infinite states.
However, since this representation does not provide any advantage, we do
not discuss it.) The game develops in turns. At each turn, a strategic-
form game is played in which the players act simultaneously. The patroller
chooses the next vertex to reach among those adjacent (directly connected)
to its current vertex, formally, called i the vertex of the patroller at turn k,
its available actions are move(j), for all vertices j, such that a(i, j) = 1. At
turn k, the intruder, if it has not previously attempted to enter any target,
chooses whether or not to enter a target and, in the first case, what target
to enter, formally, its actions are wait and enter(i). If, instead, the intruder
has previously attempted to enter a target i, it cannot take any action for
d(i) turns after having attempted to enter. This repeated game is dynamic
since it changes at each turn: the positions of the patroller (i.e., its current
vertex) and of the intruder (i.e., attacking a target or waiting) change. The
game is with imperfect information since, when the patroller acts, it does not
know whether the intruder is currently within a vertex or it is still waiting
to attack. That is, the intruder’s actions are not perfectly observable. The
game has an infinite horizon, since the intruder is allowed to wait indefinitely
outside the environment.
Figure 3 reports a portion of the extensive-form representation of the
patrolling game for the setting of Figure 1, given that the initial position of
the patroller is vertex 01. Branches represent actions and players’ information
sets are depicted as dotted lines. We recall that an information set of a player
is a set of decision nodes of the player that it cannot distinguish [10]. That
is, when the player is in any decision node of the information set, it just
knows to be in a node of that set, but it does not know in which specific
node. Information sets are used to represent players’ imperfect observation
over the actions of their opponents. In our game tree, we use information sets
in two ways. First, we use information sets of the intruder: given a decision
node η of the patroller, all the decision nodes of the intruder that are direct
descendent of η constitute an information set. This is in accordance with the
fact that, at each turn, the players act simultaneously, and the the intruder
cannot observe the last action undertaken by the patroller. Second, we use
information sets of the patroller to represent the fact that it cannot observe
the intruder’s actions except when it detects the intruder in some vertex.
The possible outcomes of the game are:
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Figure 3: A portion of the game tree for the patrolling setting of Figure 1, with the
patroller initially in 01.
• no-attack : when the intruder never enters any target;
• intruder-capture: when the intruder attempts to enter a target i at
turn k and the patroller detects the intruder in target i in the time
interval {k, k + 1, . . . , k + d(i)− 1};
• penetration-i: when the intruder enters a target i at turn k and the
patroller does not detect the intruder in target i in the time interval
{k, k + 1, . . . , k + d(i)− 1}.
Agents’ utility functions over the outcomes are defined as follows. The pa-
troller’s utility function, denoted by up, depends on the values vp of the
preserved targets. We assume the patroller to be risk neutral, and therefore:
up(x) =
{∑
i∈T vp(i) x = no-attack or intruder-capture∑
i∈T,i 6=j vp(i) x = penetration-j
.
Notice that the patroller gets the same utility when the intruder is captured
and when the intruder never enters. This is because, in the case a util-
ity surplus is given for capture, the patroller could prefer a lottery between
intruder-capture and penetration-i to no-attack. This behavior is not rea-
sonable, since the patroller’s purpose is to preserve as much value as it can.
In the case the patroller is risk averse, up should be defined as a concave
function of the sum of the preserved values. In the case it is risk seeking, up
should be defined as a convex function.
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The intruder’s utility function, denoted by ui, depends on the value vi of
the attacked target. We assume the intruder to be risk neutral, and therefore:
ui(x) =


0 x = no-attack
−ǫ x = intruder-capture
vi(i) x = penetration-i
,
where ǫ ∈ R+ is a penalty due to the capture. This is to say that the status
quo (i.e., no-attack) is better than being captured (i.e., intruder-capture) for
the intruder. In the case of risk averse or risk seeking intruder, ui should be
concave or convex, respectively.
Formally, we define the space H of all the possible histories hs of vertices
visited (or, equivalently, actions taken) by the patroller. For example, for the
setting of Figure 1, given that the patroller starts from vertex 01, a possible
history is h = 〈01, 02, 03, 07, 08〉. We define the patroller’s strategy as σp :
H → ∆(V ) where ∆(V ) is a probability distribution over the vertices V or,
equivalently, over the corresponding actions move(i)s. More precisely, given
an history h ∈ H , strategy σp gives the probability with which the patroller
will move to vertices at the next turn. Such a probability can be strictly
positive only for vertices that are adjacent to that where the patroller is after
history h. Notice that the patroller’s strategy does not depend on the actions
undertaken by the intruder. This is because the patroller cannot observe
them. (Once the patroller has observed the intruder, i.e., when the patroller
captures the intruder, the game concludes.) When σp is in pure strategies,
i.e., when σp assigns all the probability to a single vertex for each possible
history h, we say that the patrolling strategy is deterministic. For instance,
considering Figure 1 a deterministic strategy could prescribe the patroller
to follow the cycle 〈04, 05, 06, 11, 18, 17, 16, 10, 04〉. Otherwise, we say that
the patrolling strategy is non-deterministic. For instance, consider again
Figure 1 with the patroller in vertex 01 after a history h, a non-deterministic
strategy could be:
σp(h) =


01 with probability 0.25
02 with probability 0.25
06 with probability 0.5
.
We define the intruder’s strategy as σi : H → ∆(V ∪ {wait}) where ∆(V ∪
{wait}) is a probability distribution over the vertices V or, equivalently, over
the corresponding actions enter(i) and the action wait.
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2.3. Leader-Follower Solution Concept
The intruder’s ability to observe the patroller’s strategy and act on the
basis of such observation “naturally” induces one to analyze the game from a
leader-follower stance, where the patroller is the leader and the intruder is the
follower. The appropriate solution concept for leader-follower games is the
leader-follower (also said Stackelberg) equilibrium [16]. Its peculiarity is that
the leader commits to a strategy and the intruder acts as a best responder
given such commitment. Rigorously speaking, the follower is not just a best
responder: in order to have an equilibrium, if it is indifferent between some
actions, it should choose the one that maximizes the patroller’s expected
utility. In [16], the authors show that in any two-player strategic-form game
the leader never gets worse by committing to a leader-follower equilibrium
strategy than by playing a Nash equilibrium strategy. Therefore, the leader
will always commit to a leader-follower equilibrium strategy. However, to
the best of our knowledge, there is not any similar result for the game we
are dealing with (two-player extensive-form game with imperfect information
and infinite horizon). In what follows we extend the result presented in [16]
to our game.
First, we consider the patroller’s strategy in absence of any commitment,
later we will show that the patroller never gets worse when it commits to
a leader-follower equilibrium strategy. The appropriate solution concept for
an extensive-form game with imperfect information is the sequential equi-
librium [25], which is a refinement of Nash equilibrium. More precisely, a
sequential equilibrium is a pair (σ, µ) where σ is the agents’ strategy profile
and µ is a system of beliefs (it prescribes how agents update their beliefs
during the game). In a sequential equilibrium, the strategies are guaranteed
to be rational (sequential rationality) and the beliefs to be consistent with
the agents’ optimal strategies (Kreps and Wilson’s consistency). The pres-
ence of an infinite horizon complicates the study of the game. Considering
our model, the patroller’s strategy σp(h) is in principle infinite, h being in
principle infinitely long. With an infinite horizon, classic game theory studies
a game by introducing symmetries, e.g., an agent will repeat a given strat-
egy every k¯ turns. (A classical example is the Rubinstein’s alternating-offers
protocol [26], where a buyer and a seller can negotiate without any deadline.)
Introducing symmetries in our model amounts to fix the length l of the his-
tories in H . That is, in the patroller’s strategies, the next action is selected
on the basis of the last l actions, with l finite and constant during all the
game. For instance, when l = 0, actions in the patroller’s strategy do not
13
depend on any previously taken action. Namely, the probability to visit a
vertex does not depend on the (adjacent) vertex where the patroller currently
is. Hence, when l = 0, the patroller performs well only in environments that
are fully connected. When l = 1, the patroller chooses its next action on the
basis of its last action and then its strategy is Markovian. In this case, the
selection of the next vertex to visit depends only on the current vertex of the
patroller. Reasonably, when increasing the value of l, the expected utility of
the patroller never decreases, because the patroller considers more informa-
tion to select its next action. Classic game theory shows that infinite horizon
extensive-form games admit a maximum length, say l, of the symmetries such
that beyond l the expected utility does not increase anymore [10]. In our
model, this means that when the patroller’s strategy is defined on the last l
vertices with l ≥ l the patroller’s expected utility is the same it receives when
l = l. On the other hand, we expect that when increasing the value of l, the
computational complexity for finding a patrolling strategy increases. This is
because the spaces of patroller’s and intruder’s strategies become larger. In
particular, the number of possible pure strategies σp(h)s and σi(h)s is O(n
l),
where n is the number of vertices. In practical settings, the selection of a
value for l is a trade-off between expected utility and computational effort.
Given a value for l, our game can be essentially reduced to a strategic-form
game, because the game repeats every l turns. Therefore, we can consider
a reduced game that is l-turn long and constrain agents’ possible strategies
to be indefinitely repeated in all l-turn games. In our case, the patroller’s
strategy σp can be represented by a collection of {αh,i}, where αh,i is the
probability to execute actionmove(i) given history h. The intruder’s strategy
σi can be conveniently represented by using the following macro-actions:
enter-when(i, h) and stay-out. Action enter-when(i, h) corresponds to make
wait until the patroller has followed history h and then to make enter(i);
stay-out corresponds to make wait forever.
We now show that when the leader (in our case the patroller) commits to
a leader-follower equilibrium it obtains an expected utility that is not worse
than the expected utility it would obtain from a sequential equilibrium.
Theorem 2.1. Given the game described above with a fixed l, the leader
never gets worse when committing to a leader-follower equilibrium strategy
with respect to a sequential equilibrium strategy.
Proof. The finite horizon game we obtain after having introduced symme-
tries can be easily translated into a strategic-form game, as prescribed by
14
the classic normal-form of an extensive-form game [10]. If the leader does
not commit to any strategy, it receives the expected utility prescribed by a
sequential equilibrium of the game. This equilibrium is a specific Nash equi-
librium of the strategic-form game. By von Stengel and Zamir [16], in any
two-player strategic-form game, the worst leader-follower equilibrium is not
worse than the best Nash equilibrium for the leader, and therefore, in our
case, the worst leader-follower equilibrium is not worse than any sequential
equilibrium for the leader (patroller). The thesis of the theorem follows. 
According to the above theorem, in our patrolling setting the patroller
(leader) will commit to the leader-follower equilibrium strategy, which is the
optimal patrolling strategy.
2.4. Summary of the Main Results
The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm to compute the opti-
mal patrolling strategy (i.e., the leader-follower equilibrium strategy) for the
setting we consider. We present our algorithm in Sections 3 and 4. For the
sake of presentation, we discuss our algorithm under the assumption that
the setting is such that the optimal patrolling strategy gives the patroller
a non-null probability of visiting all the targets. Otherwise, at least a tar-
get would be never visited (when following the optimal patrolling strategy)
and the intruder will always have success in entering that target. In these
cases, multiple robots should be employed. We will see in Section 5 how our
approach can be used to capture some multirobot settings.
One of the most important features we considered in developing the pro-
posed algorithm is computational efficiency. In order to achieve good per-
formance in the process of finding a leader-follower equilibrium, and thus
an optimal patrolling strategy, we divided this process in two steps. In the
first one, the algorithm searches for a deterministic patrolling strategy such
that the intruder’s best response is to make stay-out. If such a strategy ex-
ists, then it is a leader-follower equilibrium strategy because it provides the
patroller with the largest utility. Instead, if such a strategy does not exist,
then the algorithm proceeds with the second step where it searches for an
equilibrium characterized by a mixed, or non-deterministic, strategy. The
main reason behind this two-step process is that searching for a determinis-
tic equilibrium strategy is computationally less expensive than searching for
a non-deterministic one. Therefore, solving the first step separately leads to
a significant improvement in computational performances every time a deter-
ministic equilibrium strategy can be found. In the following we summarize
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the details of the two steps.
In Section 3 the algorithm for computing a deterministic equilibrium pa-
trolling strategy is presented. A deterministic equilibrium strategy is found
as the solution of a feasibility problem, which is computed by resorting to con-
straint programming techniques. When solving this problem, the patrolling
setting can be significantly simplified by reducing the graph to target vertices
only. Moreover, another important advantage coming from this formulation
is that it does not depend on the history length, namely, the value of l = |h|
can be arbitrarily large.
In Section 4 the non-deterministic case is discussed. When the problem is
to find a non-deterministic equilibrium strategy, the patrolling setting must
be entirely considered, differently from the previous case. Moreover, the
mathematical formulation of the problem strongly depends on the history
length l, yielding significant influences on the computational effort needed
to compute its solution. The algorithm we propose works in three steps.
First, in order to simplify the resolution process, all the agents’ dominated
actions, i.e., the actions that a rational agent would never play, are dis-
carded. In the second step, the algorithm searches for an equilibrium where
the intruder’s strategy is stay-out and, if such equilibrium is found, the cor-
responding non-deterministic strategy of the patroller is taken as the optimal
patrolling strategy. Conversely, if the second step does not find an admissible
solution, the algorithm proceeds with the last step where a leader-follower
equilibrium is computed and the optimal patrolling strategy is found. The
problem addressed in the second step is formulated as a bilinear feasibility
mathematical programming problem while that addressed in the third step
is formulated as a multi-bilinear optimization problem.
3. Finding Deterministic Equilibrium Patrolling Strategies
In this section, we formally state the problem of finding a determinis-
tic equilibrium patrolling strategy (Section 3.1), we survey the main related
works (Section 3.2), we study the computational complexity of this prob-
lem (Section 3.3), we provide our solving algorithm (Section 3.4), and we
experimentally evaluate it (Section 3.5).
3.1. Problem Formulation
A deterministic patrolling equilibrium strategy σp is represented as a se-
quence of vertices, or equivalently as a sequence of actions move(i), such
16
that, when adopted by the patroller, each target is left uncovered for a num-
ber of turns not larger than its penetration time and thus the optimal action
of the intruder is stay-out. Indeed, if the intruder attempts to enter a target,
it will be captured by the patroller. (We recall that we are interested in
studying situations wherein the equilibrium patrolling strategy covers all the
targets.) For algorithmic reasons, we will consider deterministic equilibrium
patrolling strategies that are cyclic, namely that are composed of a finite se-
quence of vertices starting and ending with the same vertex, such that, when
indefinitely repeated by the patroller, make entering any target not rational
for the intruder. As we shall show below, our representation of deterministic
patrolling strategies does not fix any upper bound on the length l of history
h.
At first, we show that the problem of searching for a deterministic equi-
librium strategy in a graph G is equivalent to search for a deterministic
equilibrium strategy in a reduced graph G′. More precisely, we show that if
G′ admits a deterministic equilibrium strategy σ′p, then we can always derive
from σ′p a strategy σp that is a deterministic equilibrium strategy for G, and,
if G′ does not admit any deterministic equilibrium strategy, then also G does
not. Reducing G to G′, searching for a deterministic equilibrium strategy
σ′p for G
′, and deriving σp from σ
′
p will allow us to save a large amount of
computational time with respect to searching directly for σp in G. We start
by discussing how we can reduce G to G′.
The idea at the basis of reduction is that G′ is composed only of tar-
gets and the patroller will move between two targets along a shortest path
connecting them. Formally, starting from G = (V,A, T, v, d), we define
G′ = (T,A′, w, d), where targets T are the vertices of G′; A′ is the set of
arcs connecting the targets defined as a function a′ : T × T → {0, 1} and
derived from set A as follows: for every pair of targets i, j ∈ T and i 6= j,
a′(i, j) = 1 if at least one of the shortest paths connecting i to j in G does not
pass through any other target, a′(i, j) = 0 otherwise; w is a weight function
defined as w : T × T → N where w(i, j) is the length of the shortest path
between i and j in G (w(i, j) is defined only when a′(i, j) = 1); d is defined
as in G. Notice that agents’ values do not appear in G′. This is because the
computation of a deterministic equilibrium strategy covering all the targets
does not depend on their evaluations. The reduction algorithm develops in
two steps.
1. The shortest paths connecting each pair of targets are computed by
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repeatedly applying Dijkstra’s algorithm [27] to G. (Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm is applicable since no negative arc weight appears in G.) The
asymptotical worst-case computational complexity is O(tn2), where t
is the number of targets in T and n is the number of vertices in V .
2. All the shortest paths computed in the previous step are analyzed and,
for every path that does not contain targets (except from the source
and the destination), the corresponding arc is added to A′ (avoiding
duplications) and its weight w is set equal to the length of the shortest
path. This is accomplished by applying a linear search to each shortest
path with a resulting computational complexity of O(t2n).
Consider the graph reported in Figure 1. The corresponding reduced graph
G′ is reported in Figure 4(a). G′ is composed of only 5 vertices. (We report
another graph in Figure 4(b) that differs from that in (a) in the penetration
times; we shall use it as example in the following sections.)
We now show that given a strategy σ′p for G
′ we can derive a strategy σp
for G. Specifically, σp is built such that, for any pair of consecutive vertices
(i, j) in σ′p, there is a sequence of vertices (i, z1, . . . , zm, j) in σp that is a
shortest path connecting i to j. We can now state the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. If G′ admits a deterministic equilibrium strategy σ′p, then
σp (derived as discussed above) is a deterministic equilibrium strategy for G,
and, if G′ does not admit any deterministic equilibrium strategy, then also G
does not.
Proof. The proof of the first implication is trivial. Indeed, given any de-
terministic equilibrium strategy σ′p defined on G
′, the corresponding σp is a
deterministic equilibrium strategy in G, because the time (number of turns)
between two successive visits to a target in σ′p is the same that the time be-
tween two successive visits to the same target in σp (by definition of weights
w in G′). To demonstrate the second implication we proceed by contradic-
tion assuming that G admits a solution and that G′ does not. This means
that the solution in G prescribes the patroller to move between some targets
along paths different from the shortest ones. However, if no solution that
uses shortest paths can cover all the targets without leaving any one of them
uncovered for more than its penetration time, then no other solution can do
it, because, not using shortest paths, time between two successive visits to
a target can only increase. Therefore, it follows by contradiction that if G′
does not admit any solution, then also G does not. 
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Figure 4: (a) Reduced graph G′ corresponding to that of Figure 1. (b) The same graph
as in (a), but with different penetration times.
We are now in the position to formally define the problem of searching
for a deterministic equilibrium strategy. For the sake of presentation, from
here on we use σ in the place of σ′p and we talk of vertices of G
′ and σ,
instead of targets. Formally, we define a function σ : {1, 2, . . . , s} → T ,
where σ(j) is the j-th element of the sequence. The length of the sequence is
s. The temporal length of a sequence of visits is computed by summing the
weights of covered arcs, i.e., by summing the times (in number of turns) for
covering arcs,
∑s−1
j=1w (σ(j), σ(j + 1)). The time interval between two visits
of a vertex is calculated similarly, summing the weights of the arcs covered
between the two visits.
A solution of our problem (a deterministic equilibrium patrolling strat-
egy) is a sequence σ such that the following properties are satisfied:
1. σ is cyclical, i.e., the first vertex coincides with the last one, namely,
σ(1) = σ(s);
2. every vertex in T is visited at least once, i.e., there are no uncovered
vertices;
3. when indefinitely repeating the cycle, for any i ∈ T , the time interval
between two successive visits of i is never larger than d(i).
It is clear that, when the patroller follows repeatedly such a sequence σ as
its patrolling strategy, no intrusion can occur.
Let denote by Oi(j) the position in σ of the j-th occurrence of i and by oi
the total number of i’s occurrences in σ. For instance, consider Figure 4(a):
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given σ = 〈14, 08, 18, 08, 14〉, O08(1) = 2 and O08(2) = 4, while o08 = 2 and
o06 = 0. Notice that, given a sequence σ, quantities Oi(j) and oi can be
easily calculated.
Given such definitions we can formally re-state the problem in a mathe-
matical programming fashion. We aim at finding a sequence σ of s visits to
vertices of G′ (targets) such that the following constraints are satisfied:
σ(1) = σ(s) (1)
oi ≥ 1 ∀i ∈ T (2)
a′ (σ(j − 1), σ(j)) = 1 ∀j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , s} (3)
Oi(k+1)−1X
j=Oi(k)
w (σ(j), σ(j + 1)) ≤ d(i) ∀i ∈ T, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , oi − 1} (4)
Oi(1)−1X
j=1
w (σ(j), σ(j + 1)) +
s−1X
j=Oi(oi)
w (σ(j), σ(j + 1)) ≤ d(i) ∀i ∈ T (5)
Constraint (1) states that σ is a cycle, i.e., the first and last vertices of σ
coincide; constraints (2) state that every vertex is visited at least once in
σ; constraints (3) state that for every pair of consecutively visited vertices,
say σ(j − 1) and σ(j), it is a′(σ(j − 1), σ(j)) = 1, i.e., vertex σ(j) can be
directly reached from vertex σ(j − 1) in G′; constraints (4) state that, for
every vertex i, the temporal interval between two successive visits of i in σ
is not larger than d(i); similarly, constraints (5) state that for every vertex i
the temporal interval between the last and first visits of i is not larger than
d(i), i.e., the deadline of i must be respected also along the cycle closure.
Hence, our goal is to find a sequence of vertices σ(1), σ(2), . . . , σ(s) such
that the above constraints are satisfied. Notice that also the length s of the
sequence must be found as part of the solution. In Section 3.4, we present a
method for finding a sequence σ that satisfies constraints (1)-(5).
If we consider, for instance, the problem described by the graph of Fig-
ure 4(a), it is easy to show that no sequence of visits can satisfy all the
constraints described above. To see this, it is enough to observe that the
shortest cycle covering only vertices 06 and 08, i.e., 〈06, 08, 06〉, has a tem-
poral length larger than the penetration times of both the involved vertices,
so there is no way to cover these vertices (and others) within their penetra-
tion times. As we shall show below, the problem described by the graph of
Figure 4(b) admits a deterministic equilibrium strategy.
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3.2. Related Works
To the best of our knowledge, the strategic patrolling literature does
not present significant works for finding a deterministic equilibrium strategy.
In particular, it does not take into account the penetration times of the
targets, see, e.g., [28, 29]. A larger amount of works related to our problem
can be found in the operational research literature, since the problem is
ultimately that of finding a particular sequence of vertices in the graph G′.
The main of these works are extensions and refinements of the Traveling
Salesman Problem (TSP). The first extension of the TSP we consider relates
to settings with temporal constraints and is called deadline-TSP [30]. In
this problem vertices have deadlines over their first visit and some time is
spent traversing arcs. Rewards are collected when a vertex is visited before
its deadline, while penalties are assigned when a vertex is either visited after
its deadline or is not visited at all. The objective is to find a tour that
maximizes the reward, visiting as many vertices as possible. Vertices can be
visited more than once in the tour, but the reward/penalty is received only
at the first visit. A more general variant is the Vehicle Routing Problem with
Time Windows [31] where deadlines are replaced with time windows, during
which visits of vertices must occur. This problem has been studied also by
employing constraint programming techniques [32]. Cyclical sequences of
visits are addressed in the period routing problem [33] where vehicle routes
are constructed to run for a finite period of time in which every vertex has to
be visited according to a given frequency. Frequencies can be given also as
lower bounds, considering the real frequencies of visits as decision variables
of the problem [34]. In the cyclic inventory routing problem [35] vertices
represent customers with a given demand rate and storage capacity. The
objective is to find a tour such that a distributor can repeatedly restock
customers under some constraints over visiting frequencies.
Two are the main issues that distinguish our problem from those described
above. The first one is that our problem is defined according to relative dead-
lines (calculated with respect to two consecutive visits to the same vertex)
and the absolute deadlines (calculated with respect to the beginning of the
sequence) depend on the solution itself, as expressed by constraints (4)-(5).
The extension of the above works, mostly considering absolute deadlines, to
our problem introduces highly non-linear constraints and does not seem to
be straightforward. The second issue is that in our problem we aim at find-
ing only a solution, and not the optimal solution according to some metric.
Thus, we are solving a feasibility problem and not an optimization problem.
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3.3. NP-Completeness
In this section we discuss the computational complexity of finding a de-
terministic equilibrium strategy for our patrolling setting, denoted as the
DET-STRAT problem.
Theorem 3.2. The DET-STRAT problem is NP-complete.
Proof. We prove the NP-completeness by reducing the Directed Hamilto-
nian Circuit problem (DHC) [36] to the DET-STRAT problem. DHC is
the problem of determining if an Hamiltonian path, i.e., a path that vis-
its each vertex exactly once, exists in a given directed graph. This is a
well-known NP-complete problem. (For the sake of simplicity, we consider
a graph G = (V,A, T, v, d). A similar, but more complicated, proof can be
produced considering a graph G′ = (T,A, w, d).) Let us consider a generic
instance of the DHC problem given by a directed graph Gh = (Vh, Ah) where
Vh is the set of vertices and Ah is the set of arcs. In order to prove that
DHC can be reduced to the DET-STRAT problem, we show that for every
instance Gh of the DHC problem an instance Gs of the DET-STRAT prob-
lem can be built in polynomial time and that by solving the DET-STRAT
problem on Gs we obtain also a solution for the DHC problem on Gh. An
instance Gs = (Vs, As, Ts, vs, ds) can be easily constructed from Gh in the fol-
lowing way: Vs = Ts = Vh, As = Ah, for every v ∈ Vs we impose d(v) = |Vh|
and the functions vs can be arbitrarily defined. It is straightforward to see
that a solution of Gs, if it exists, is an Hamiltonian cycle. Indeed, since the
relative deadline of every target is equal to the number of targets, a deter-
ministic equilibrium strategy should visit each target exactly once, otherwise
at least one relative deadline would be violated (recall that covering one arc
in Gs is assumed to require one time unit). Therefore, computing the so-
lution for Gs provides by construction a solution for Gh or, in other words,
the DHC problem can be reduced to the DET-STRAT problem, proving its
NP-completeness (it is trivially polynomial to verify that a given sequence of
vertices is a solution of the DET-STRAT problem). 
3.4. Solving Algorithm
In this section, we present our basic solving algorithm (Section 3.4.1), we
report an example (Section 3.4.2), we theoretically analyze some properties
of the algorithm (Section 3.4.3), and we show how to improve its efficiency
(Section 3.4.4).
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3.4.1. Basic Algorithm
We formulate the problem of finding a deterministic equilibrium patrolling
strategy described in the Section 3.1 as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem
(CSP) [37]. Each σ(j) is considered as a variable with domain Fj ⊆ T .
The constraints over the values of the variables are (1)-(5). A solution is an
assignment of values to all the variables such that all those constraints are
satisfied. When the problem is put in this form, it resembles some problems
of CSP-based scheduling. When compared with the large literature in AI that
studies scheduling problems, cyclic scheduling presents comparatively limited
results (e.g., [38]). Differently from the problems studied in the literature, in
our problem the number s of variables σ(j)s which compose the solution is
not known in advance and must be computed as part of the solution. This is
because a vertex can appear more times in σ. As a consequence, we cannot
resort to constrain programming tools, e.g., ILOG CP [39], and we need to
develop an ad hoc algorithm.
The algorithm we propose for finding a solution basically searches the
state space with backtracking. Forward checking [37] is used in the attempt
to reduce the branching of the search tree. We report our algorithm in
Algorithms 1, 2, and 3.
Algorithm 1 simply assigns σ(1) a vertex i ∈ T . Notice that if a solution
exists, it can be found independently of the first vertex appearing in σ. Since
the solution σ is a cycle that visits all vertices, every vertex can be chosen
as the initial one. Hence, the choice of i in Algorithm 1 does not affect the
possibility of finding a solution.
Algorithm 1: find solution(T,A′, w, d)
select a vertex i in T1
assign σ(1) ← i2
call recursive call(T,A′, w, d, σ, 2)3
Algorithm 2 assigns σ(j) a vertex from domain Fj ⊆ T , which contains
available values for σ(j) that are returned by the forward checking algorithm
(Algorithm 3). If Fj is empty or no vertex in Fj can be successfully assigned
to σ(j), then Algorithm 2 returns failure and a backtracking is performed.
Algorithm 3 restricts Fj to the vertices directly reachable from the last as-
signed vertex σ(j−1) such that their visits do not violate constraints (4)-(5).
Notice that checking constraints (4)-(5) requires knowing the weights (tem-
poral costs) related to the arcs between the vertices that could be assigned
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Algorithm 2: recursive call(T,A′, w, d, σ, j)
if σ(1) = σ(j − 1) and constraints (2) hold then1
if constraints (5) hold then2
return σ3
else4
return failure5
else6
assign Fj ← forward checking(T,A
′, w, d, σ, j)7
for all the i in Fj do8
assign σ(j) ← i9
assign σ′ ← recursive call(T,A′, w, d, σ, j + 1)10
if σ′ is not failure then11
return σ′12
return failure13
subsequently, i.e., between the variables σ(k) with k > j. For example, con-
sider the graph of Figure 4(b) and suppose that the partial solution currently
constructed by the algorithm is σ = 〈14〉. In this situation, we cannot check
the validity of constraints (4)-(5) since we have no information about times to
cover the arcs between the vertices that will complete the solution. In order
to cope with this, we estimate the unknown temporal costs by employing an
admissible heuristic (i.e., a non-strict underestimate) based on the minimum
cost between two vertices. The heuristic being admissible, no feasible solu-
tion is discarded. We denote the heuristic value by w, e.g., w(i, σ(1)) denotes
the weight of the shortest path between i and σ(1). We assume w(i, i) = 0
for any i.
Given a partial solution σ from 1 to j−1, the forward checking algorithm
considers all the vertices directly reachable from σ(j−1) and keeps those that
do not violate the relaxed constraints (4)-(5) computed with heuristic values.
It considers a vertex i directly reachable from σ(j − 1) and assumes that
σ(j) = i. Step 5 of Algorithm 3 checks relaxed constraints (5) with respect
to i, assuming that the weight along the cycle closure from σ(j) = i to σ(1)
is minimum. In the above example, with σ(1) = 14, the vertices directly
reachable from σ(1) are 08 and 18. The algorithm considers σ(2) = 08. By
Step 5, we have w(σ(1), 08) +w(08, σ(1)) = 4 ≤ d(08) = 18 and then Step 5
is satisfied. It can be easily observed that such condition holds also at the
next iteration of the cycle, when σ(2) = 18. Step 8 of Algorithm 3 checks
relaxed constraints (5) with respect to all the vertices k 6= i, assuming that
both the weight to reach k from σ(j) = i and the weight along the cycle
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closure from k to σ(1) are minimum. Consider again the above example.
It can be easily observed that when σ(2) = 08 such conditions hold for
all k. Instead, at the next iteration, when σ(2) = 18 and k = 06 we have
w(σ(1), 18) + w(18, 06) + w(06, σ(1)) = 16 > d(06) = 14. The relaxed
constraint is violated and vertex 18 will be not inserted in Fj . Similarly,
Step 6 checks relaxed constraints (4) with respect to i and Step 9 checks
relaxed constraints (4) with respect to any k assuming that the weight to
reach k from σ(j) = i is minimum. In the above example, starting from
σ = 〈14〉, the relaxed constraints are satisfied only when i = 08 and therefore
Fj = {08}. Finally, we notice that Steps 5 and 8 are checked only when oi = 0
and ok = 0, respectively, since it can be easily proved that when oi > 0 and
ok > 0 these conditions always hold.
Algorithm 3: forward checking(T,A′, w, d, σ, j)
assign Fj ← ∅1
assign s← j − 12
for all members i in T such that a′(σ(s), i) = 1 do3
if conditions4 “
oi = 0 ∧
Ps−1
l=1 w(σ(l), σ(l + 1)) +w(σ(s), i) + w(i, σ(1)) ≤ d(i) or5
oi > 0 ∧
Ps−1
l=Oi(oi)
w(σ(l), σ(l + 1)) + w(σ(s), i) ≤ d(i)
”
and,6
for all k 6= i,7 “
ok = 0 ∧
Ps−1
l=1 w(σ(l), σ(l + 1)) +w(σ(s), i) +w(i, k) + w(k, σ(1)) ≤ d(k) or8
ok > 0 ∧
Ps−1
l=Ok(ok)
w(σ(l), σ(l + 1)) + w(σ(s), i) + w(i, k) ≤ d(k)
”
9
hold then10
add i to Fj11
return Fj12
3.4.2. Example
We apply our algorithm to the example of Figure 4(b). We use a random
selection in Step 1 of Algorithm 1 (to choose the first visited vertex of the
sequence) and in Step 7 of Algorithm 2 (to choose the elements of Fj as part
of the current candidate solution). We report part of the execution trace
(Figure 5 depicts the complete search tree):
(a) the algorithm assigns σ(1) = 14;
(b) the domain F2 (depicted in the figure between curly brackets beside
vertex σ(1) = 14) is produced as follows (recall the discussion of the
previous section):
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• vertex 08 is added to F2, since all the conditions in Algorithm 3
with i = 08 are satisfied;
• vertex 18 is not added to F2, since the condition in Step 8 of
Algorithm 3 with k = 06 is not satisfied, formally, w(14, 18) +
w(18, 06) + w(06, 14) > d(06);
• no other vertex is added to F2, since no other vertex is directly
reachable from 14;
(c) the algorithm assigns σ(2) = 08;
(d) the domain F3 is produced similarly as above, yielding to F3 = {06};
(e) the algorithm assigns σ(3) = 06 and continues.
Some issues are worth noting. In the 9th node of the search tree, a sequence
σ with σ(1) = σ(s) and including all the vertices was found. However, this
sequence does not satisfy constraints (5). If the search is not stopped and
backtracked at the the 9th node (in Step 5 of Algorithm 2), the algorithm
would never terminate. Indeed, the subtrees that would follow this vertex
would be the infinite repetition of part of the tree already built; in particular,
of the solution in bold of Figure 5. Finally, in the 5th node, no possible
successor is allowed by the forward checking, and therefore the algorithm
backtracks.
3.4.3. Some Properties of the Algorithm
In this section, we present some properties of the proposed algorithm. At
first, we prove its soundness and completeness.
Theorem 3.3. The algorithm of Section 3.4.1 is sound and complete.
Proof. We initially prove the soundness of the algorithm. We need to prove
that all the solutions it produces satisfy constraints (1)-(5). Constraints (1),
(2), and (5) are satisfied by Algorithm 2. If at least one of them does not
hold, no solution is produced. The satisfaction of constraints (3) is assured
by Algorithm 3 in Step 3, while the satisfaction of constraints (4) is assured
by Algorithm 3 in Steps 6 and 9.
In order to prove completeness we need to show that the algorithm pro-
duces a solution whenever at least one exists. In the algorithm there are only
two points in which a candidate solution is discarded. The first one is the for-
ward checking in Algorithm 3. Indeed, it iteratively applies constraints (4)-
(5) to a partial sequence σ exploiting a heuristic over the future weights (i.e.,
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Figure 5: Search tree for the example of Figure 4(b); bold nodes and arrows denote the
obtained solution; Fjs are reported besides nodes σ(j− 1); x
th denotes the order in which
the tree’s nodes are analyzed.
the time spent to visit the successive vertices). Since the employed heuristic
is admissible, no feasible candidate solution can be discarded. The second
point is the stopping criterion in Algorithm 2: when all the vertices occur in
σ (at least once) and the first and the last vertex in σ are equal, no further
successor is considered and the search is stopped. If σ satisfies all the con-
straints, then σ is a solution, otherwise backtracking is performed. We show
that, if a solution can be found without stopping the search at this point,
then a solution can be found also by stopping the search and backtracking
(the vice versa does not hold). This issue is of paramount importance since
it assures that the algorithm terminates (recall the example of the previous
section in which, without this stopping criterion, the search could not termi-
nate). Consider a σ such that σ(1) = σ(s) and including all the vertices in T .
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The search subtree following σ(s) and produced by the proposed algorithm
is (non-strictly) contained in the search tree following from σ(1). This is
because the constraints considered by the forward checking from σ(s) on are
(non-strictly) harder than the corresponding ones from σ(1) to σ(s). The
increased hardness is due to the activation of constraints (4) that are needed
given that at least one occurrence of each vertex is in σ. Thus, if a solution
can be found by searching from σ(s), then a shorter solution can be found
by stopping the search at σ(s) and backtracking. This concludes the proof
of completeness. 
Now we derive an upper bound over the temporal length of σ.
Theorem 3.4. If the problem defined in Section 3.1 admits a solution, then
there exists at least a solution σ with temporal length no longer thanmaxt∈T{d(t)}.
Proof. In order to prove the theorem it is sufficient to prove that, if a problem
is solvable, then there exists a solution σ in which there is at least a vertex
that only appears once, excluding σ(s). Indeed, if this statement holds then
the maximum temporal length of σ is bounded by d(i) where i is the vertex
that appears only one time in σ. It easily follows that, in the worst case, the
maximum temporal length of σ is maxt∈T{d(t)}. Figure 6 shows a situation
in which the temporal length of the unique solution is exactly maxt∈T{d(t)}.
01
d(01) = 4
02
d(02) = 2
03
d(03) = 4
1
1
1
1
Figure 6: A situation in which the temporally shortest solution is as long as the upper
bound of Theorem 3.4.
We now prove that, if the problem is solvable, then there is a solution
in which at least a vertex appears only once. To prove this, we consider a
solution σ wherein σ(1) is the vertex with the minimum relative deadline,
i.e, σ(1) = argmint∈T{d(t)}. (Notice that, according to the discussion of
Algorithm 1, this assignment does not preclude finding a solution.) We call
k the minimum integer such that all the vertices appear in the subsequence
σ(1)−σ(k). We show that, if the problem is solvable, then it is not necessary
that vertex v = σ(k) appears again after k. A visit to v after k would be
observed if either it is necessary to pass through v to reach σ(1) or it is
necessary to re-visit v, due to its relative deadline, before σ(1). However,
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since all the vertices but v = σ(k) are visited before k, all the vertices but
v can be visited without necessarily visiting v. Furthermore, the deadline
of σ(1) is by hypothesis harder than σ(k)’s one and then the occurrence of
v = σ(k) after k is not necessary. Therefore, vertex σ(k) occurs only one
time. 
The above theorem provides an upper bound on the temporal length
of σ. Notice that there are cases for which this bound is exact; namely, there
are instances of the problem for which the temporally shortest solution has
length exactly maxt∈T {d(t)} (as in the graph of Figure 6). In other cases, the
bound is not exact (as in Figure 6 with d(01) = 5). In any case, the upper
bound can be exploited to limit the depth of the search tree preserving the
algorithm’s completeness. Indeed, if
∑s−1
l=1 w(σ(l), σ(l+1))+w(σ(s), σ(1)) >
maxt∈T {d(t)}, then the search can be safely stopped and backtracked.
Finally, we focus on linear settings, namely on situations in which a de-
terministic equilibrium strategy has to be found for a patroller acting in
corridors (see, e.g., Figure 6) and rings. These settings appear commonly in
real-world applications and their study can lead to the definition of simple
heuristics that are very effective also for non-linear settings.
Proposition 3.5. If a problem defined on a linear graph admits a solution,
then the linear sequence of the vertices is a solution.
Proof sketch. Consider a setting like that in Figure 6, with any functions w
and d. Suppose σ(1) = 01 and consequently σ(2) = 02. If there is no feasible
σ with σ(3) = 03, then the problem is not feasible. Indeed, if σ(3) = 03 does
not satisfy the constraints over the deadline of 01 along the cycle closure,
then there is not any k such that σ(k) = 03 satisfies such constraints. The
same argument can be applied to any other vertex and to any linear graph.

The above proposition suggests a simple method to check the feasibility
of a problem defined on a linear graph. If the linear sequence is not feasible,
then the problem is unfeasible, otherwise it constitutes a solution. The length
of such solution grows linearly in the number of vertices. Notice that the
problem can admit more solutions, and the length of some of them can be
larger than that of the linear solution. For example, in Figure 6, with d(03)
arbitrarily large, a solution could be σ = 〈01, 02, 01, 02, . . . , 03, 02, 01〉.
Let us now consider our algorithm in linear settings. At first, we note that
the problem is feasible if and only the application of the forward checking
to the two extremes of the graph returns non-null domains. This is because,
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the conditions considered in the forward checking correspond exactly to the
feasibility of the linear sequence and therefore, if the problem is unfeasible,
the returned domain is empty. Furthermore, in order to guide efficiently the
search it is sufficient that at each node of the search tree the successors are
ordered from the minimum to the maximum oi. In this case, the algorithm
produces a search tree whose size is linear in the number of vertices.
3.4.4. Improving Efficiency and Heuristics
In this section, we show how to reduce the number of constraints to be
checked in the forward checking, we introduce a more sophisticated stopping
criterion, and we propose some heuristics to select vertices.
Consider the conditions in Steps 5 and 8 of Algorithm 3. Except for
the first execution of Algorithm 3 (i.e., when j = 2), the satisfaction of the
condition at Step 5 for a given j is granted if the condition in Step 8 for
j − 1 is satisfied. Therefore, we can safely limit the algorithm to check the
conditions at Step 5 exclusively when j = 2. The same considerations hold
also for the conditions in Steps 6 and 9. Therefore, we can safely limit the
algorithm to check the conditions at Step 6 exclusively when j = 2.
We also introduce a more sophisticated stopping criterion called LSC
(Length Stopping Criterion) based on Theorem 3.4 such that if
∑s−1
l=1 w(σ(l), σ(l+
1)) + w(σ(s), σ(1)) > maxt∈T {d(t)}, then the search is stopped and back-
tracked. We introduce also an a priori check (IFC, initial Forward Check-
ing): before starting the search, we consider each vertex as the root node of
the search tree and we apply the forward checking. If at least one domain is
empty, the algorithm returns failure. Otherwise, the tree search is started.
Finally, we introduce some heuristic criteria for choosing the next vertex
to expand in Step 8 of Algorithm 2: lexicographic (hl), random with uniform
probability distribution (hr), maximum and minimum number of incident
arcs (hmax a and hmin a), less visited (hmin v), and maximum and minimum
penetration time (hmax d and hmin d). For all the ordering criteria except hr,
we introduce a criterion for breaking ties (RTB, Random Tie-Break) that
selects a vertex with uniform probability. We used the previous heuristics
also for selecting the initial node of the search tree in Step 1 of Algorithm 1.
3.5. Experimental Results
In this section, we experimentally evaluate the performance of our al-
gorithm in producing a deterministic equilibrium strategy or in returning
a failure. We developed a random generator of graphs G′ with parameters
30
n (number of vertices, corresponding to targets) and m (number of arcs)
and working as follows. Given two values n and m, firstly a random con-
nected graph with n vertices is produced, then m − n arcs are added. All
the arcs’ weights are set equal to 1 (it can be easily shown that this is
the worst case for computational complexity). Values d(k) are uniformly
drawn from the interval [mini,j {w(i, j) + w(j, i)}, 2n
2maxi,j w(i, j)], where
w(i, j) is the length of the shortest path between vertices i and j. The
lower bound of the interval comes from the consideration that settings with
d(k) < mini,j {w(i, j) + w(j, i)} are infeasible and our algorithm immediately
detects that unfeasibility (by IFC). The upper bound is justified by consid-
ering that if a problem is feasible then it always admits a solution shorter
than 2n2maxi,j{w(i, j)}. Graphs differ from each other in the topology and
in the penetration times of the vertices. This program and those implement-
ing our algorithms have been coded in C and executed on a Linux (2.6.24
kernel) computer equipped with a DUAL QUAD CORE Intel XEON 2.33
GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM, and 4 MB cache.
For each ordering criterion (i.e., hl, hr, hmax a, hmin a, hmin v, hmax d,
hmin d) with and without LSC and IFC and for each n ∈ {3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 100, 250, 500}
we produce 1000 patrolling settings with m uniformly drawn from the inter-
val [n, (n − 1)n] (if m < n the graph is not connected, if m > (n − 1)n at
least a pair of vertices is connected by more than one arc). We evaluate the
percentage of terminations of the algorithm within 10 minutes and, in the
case of termination (either with a solution or with a failure), the computa-
tional time. Since, as discussed in the Section 3.1, our approach is aimed at
finding a solution and not the optimal solution according to a given metric
(e.g., the cycle length), we do not measure the quality of a solution.
The most significant experimental results we obtained are reported in Ta-
ble 1: the numbers reported in the table are averaged over the 1000 settings
that have been generated as discussed above. The table shows the termi-
nation percentage and, for terminated runs, the average time, its standard
deviation, and the maximum and minimum observed times. The first remark
is that, for all the algorithm configurations, the averaged computational time
is reasonably short also for large settings. Instead, the termination percent-
age differs very much in different configurations. In this sense, the behavior
of the proposed algorithm resembles that of many constraint programming
algorithms, whose termination time is usually either very short (when a so-
lution is found) or the algorithms do not terminate within the deadline. The
random generation of graphs explains the data relative to the maximum com-
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n 3 4 5 6 7 8 100 250 500
hmin v % 100 100 100 99.8 99.6 99.5 98.9 96.6 90.2
RTB time [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.32 0.10 0.05 0.16 0.87 5.50
LSC dev [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 5.17 1.78 0.96 3.52 14.47 30.28
IFC max [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 98.00 35.00 19.00 78.26 316.9 413.94
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 0.07
hr % 100 100 100 98.5 97.5 96.5 95.1 55.1 9.8
LSC time [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.02 1.34 2.52 4.66
IFC dev [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 1.64 1.70 1.73 0.18 6.19 16.75 51.62
max [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 32.00 33.00 24.00 2.00 93.36 513.66 590.87
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 0.07
hr % 100 100 99.0 97.2 96.7 95.5 94.0 53.0 8.9
IFC time [s] < 0.01 0.44 3.65 0.14 0.26 0.01 7.12 3.41 5.94
dev [s] < 0.01 8.68 38.89 2.24 2.36 0.16 39.32 18.02 55.14
max [s] < 0.01 173.55 594.10 43.03 31.86 2.09 561.95 501.72 582.77
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 0.07
hmin v % 100 100 100 96.7 96.0 95.5 95.0 93.3 86.2
RTB time [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 0.34 2.98 0.16 0.01 0.30 1.00 6.19
LSC dev [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 6.29 33.77 2.24 0.11 6.50 15.32 35.77
max [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 125.03 519.75 42.22 2.41 145.22 366.42 498.04
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 0.07
hr % 100 100 100 95.4 93.9 92.5 91.2 52.4 7.7
LSC time [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 0.79 3.04 0.30 0.03 7.16 3.48 5.83
dev [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 13.58 24.32 2.77 0.21 39.53 18.46 55.65
max [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 270.03 303.72 41.53 2.83 566.04 531.64 596.42
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07
hr % 100 100 98.7 94.2 93.0 91.8 90.3 51.0 7.1
time [s] < 0.01 7.45 2.45 4.78 1.38 0.14 1.37 3.74 6.18
dev [s] < 0.01 55.45 28.61 42.13 9.96 1.03 6.28 18.45 56.80
max [s] < 0.01 556.92 506.72 496.84 140.31 12.86 93.26 516.72 576.52
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07
hl % 100 99.2 91.0 81.1 75.3 69.0 3.9 2.3 1.5
LSC time [s] < 0.01 7.45 2.45 4.78 1.38 0.14 0.10 0.01 0.07
IFC dev [s] < 0.01 55.45 28.61 42.13 9.96 1.03 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01
max [s] < 0.01 548.41 505.74 497.46 140.11 12.01 < 0.01 0.01 0.07
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 0.01 0.07
hl % 100 99.2 88.0 78.0 71.7 65.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
time [s] < 0.01 7.42 2.61 5.12 1.61 0.20 − − −
dev [s] < 0.01 55.23 28.66 42.65 10.57 1.29 − − −
max [s] < 0.01 548.41 505.74 497.46 140.11 12.01 − − −
min [s] < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 < 0.01 − − −
Table 1: Experimental results for different algorithm configurations.
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putational time: some cases are harder than the average and require a lot of
time to be solved (in practice, they both reduce the percentage of termination
and increase the computational time). These hard cases, which represent out-
liers of the population of graphs, are characterized by complicated topologies
or oddly-distributed relative deadlines.
Here are some comments regarding other issues.
Ordering criteria The best ordering criterion is hmin v with RTB. We omit
the experimental results with hmax a, hmin a, hmax d, and hmin d, since
they are very similar to those obtained with hl. The criterion hmin v
with RTB leads the algorithm to terminate with a percentage close to
hr for small values of n and about 80% larger for large values of n.
Instead, hl provides very bad performance, especially for large values
of n, when the algorithm terminates with percentages close to 0%.
LSC The improved stopping criterion allows the algorithm to increase the
termination percentage by a value between 0% and 2%, without dis-
tinguishable effects on the computational time. This improvement de-
pends on the configuration of the algorithm since it affects the con-
struction of the search tree.
IFC This criterion allows the algorithm to increase the termination percent-
age by a value between 1% and 4%, reducing the computational time
(since all the non-feasible linear settings are solved with a negligible
computational time). This improvement does not depend on the con-
figuration of the algorithm since it does not affect the search, working
before it.
Therefore the best algorithm configuration is hmin v with RTB, LSC, and IFC.
With this configuration, the results are good: the termination percentage
is very high also for large settings, like those with 500 vertices, and the
corresponding average computational time, about 5.5 s, is reasonably short.
We notice that in some practical indoor settings the number of vertices is in
the range {24, . . . , 100}, see, e.g., [24].
4. Finding Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Patrolling Strategies
In this section, we consider the problem of finding non-deterministic equi-
librium patrolling strategies for the game formulated in Section 2.2. We recall
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that, according to the proposed approach, given a patrolling setting, we first
look for a deterministic equilibrium strategy that, if found, makes attacking
a target not rational for the intruder. If a deterministic equilibrium strat-
egy cannot be found, we look for a non-deterministic equilibrium strategy,
following the algorithm presented in this section to find leader-follower equi-
libria. In what follows, we survey the main related works on the computation
of leader-follower equilibria (Section 4.1), we present our solving algorithm
(Section 4.2), and we experimentally evaluate it (Section 4.3).
4.1. Related Works
The literature presents some works on the computation of leader-follower
equilibria that are based on operational research techniques. Basically, the
computation of a leader-follower equilibrium can be formulated as a multi-
level optimization problem [40], where each level corresponds to a specific
player. In our case, the first optimization level is associated to the patroller
and the second one to the intruder. When both the optimization problems (at
the first and second level) are linear, the algorithmic game theory literature
provides assessed techniques for their solution [41]. When, instead, at least
an optimization problem (at the first or second level) is not linear, as it
turns out to be in our case, works in literature provide more a collection of
examples than a coherent set of results. We briefly review these works.
The main result on which other algorithms for finding leader-follower
equilibria are based is by von Stengel and Zamir [16]: at the equilibrium,
the follower always employs pure strategies, playing the best response for the
strategy the leader committed to. (We recall that, at the equilibrium, the
follower, when more equivalent best responses are available, must choose the
one that maximizes the leader’s expected utility.)
Two are the main works addressing the situation in which both the levels
of the optimization problem are linear. The first one is by Conitzer and Sand-
holm [41]. The authors formulate the problem of finding a leader-follower
equilibrium as a multi-linear programming problem (Multi-LP). The basic
idea is, for each action a of the follower, to compute the (mixed) strategy of
the leader σl that maximizes the leader’s expected utility under the constraint
that a is a follower’s best response. Among all such strategies σls, the leader
will choose the one that maximizes its expected utility. With this method,
there are as many optimization problems as pure strategies of the follower
and each single optimization problem is linear. Conitzer and Sandholm show
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in [41] that the problem of computing mixed-strategy leader-follower equi-
libria in two-player complete-information games is polynomial in the size of
the game. The same result holds also when the leader’s type is uncertain.
Instead, when the follower’s type is uncertain the problem is NP-hard. The
second work is by Paruchuri et al. [8], in which the authors propose an alter-
native mathematical programming formulation based on mixed integer linear
programming (MILP) that is shown to be more efficient with multiple fol-
lower’s types with respect to the Multi-LP formulation of [41]. The basic
idea behind this alternative approach is to represent the follower’s actions as
binary variables where value 1 means that the corresponding action is played
and value 0 means that it is not.
As said, when the optimization problems involved in the determination
of leader-follower equilibria are non-linear, no assessed technique is available.
Non-linear optimization problems have been studied mainly when the non-
linearity lays in the second level and the optimization problem is convex and
regular. In these cases, the Karush-Khun-Tucker [42] theorem is employed to
linearize the optimization problem. In our case, we cannot apply this method
because, as discussed later, our problem is not convex. Alternative methods
are based on non-exact linearization and produce approximate solutions [42].
Computing equilibria in games in practical settings usually requires a
large computational effort. A simple approach to save computational time
is the reduction of the search space. Customarily, in game theory, this is
accomplished by exploiting the concept of dominance: action a of player i is
said to be (weakly) dominated by another action a′ of player i if player i’s
expected utility from playing action a is never larger than expected utility
from playing action a′ (independently of the actions of the other players).
Dominated actions can be safely removed, since they will be never played
by rational agents. Usually, removing dominated actions is computationally
inexpensive and drastically reduces the search space, improving the compu-
tational efficiency of the solving algorithm [43].
4.2. Solving Algorithm
In this section, we overview the proposed solving algorithm (Section 4.2.1),
we describe in detail its steps (Section 4.2.2 and Section 4.2.3), we provide a
specific formulation for strictly competitive settings (Section 4.2.4), and we
discuss some theoretical properties of the algorithm (Section 4.2.5).
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4.2.1. Algorithm Overview
Our algorithm works on the original graphG as defined in Section 2.1. We
shall show in Section 4.2.5 that a reduction to a graph G′ composed only of
target vertices (as done in Section 3) cannot be applied when searching for a
non-deterministic equilibrium strategy. The algorithm depends on the value
of l, namely on the finite length of actions’ history. In this paper, we provide
the algorithm for the case l = 1. This is because, formulations with l = 0 are
applicable only to environments with fully connected topologies (as discussed
in Section 2.3 and further detailed in Section 4.2.5) and formulations with
l > 1, as we shall discuss below, can be obtained by extending the case with
l = 1. Our algorithm develops in three steps as follows.
1. The first step removes the dominated actions (of the patroller and of
the intruder) that the agents will never play.
2. The aim of this step is to check whether or not there exists a patroller’s
strategy such that intruder’s action stay-out is a best response. If there
exists such a strategy, it is the optimal patrolling strategy. Otherwise,
the algorithm passes to the third step.
3. The aim of this step is to compute the equilibrium strategy for the
patroller under the assumption that the intruder will not make stay-out.
4.2.2. Removing Dominated Actions
The first step of our algorithm is the removal of agents’ dominated actions.
We remark that, to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to
apply dominated action removal to patrolling problems. This step splits
into two phases: at first we remove the patroller’s dominated actions and,
subsequently, we remove the intruder’s dominated actions.
We focus on the patroller’s side. We recall that the actions of the patroller
are of the form move(i). This means that, if action move(i) is dominated,
the patroller will never visit vertex i and then such vertex can be eliminated
from the patrolling problem. Therefore, by discarding patroller’s dominated
actions, we obtain a reduction of the graph G. Basically, we can remove any
vertex i (and all its ingoing and outgoing arcs) such that the correspond-
ing action move(i) is dominated by another action move(j) (with j 6= i),
independently of the intruder’s strategy, in the following way.
1. For each target t, we remove from G any vertex i such that the shortest
distance between i and t is strictly larger than the penetration time
d(t). A rational patroller will never visit such vertices. Indeed, if it
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visits them, then the intruder will attack target t being sure not to be
captured in the next d(t) turns. If, after this removal, the graph is not
connected, then there is not any non-deterministic equilibrium strategy
that can cover all the targets. In this case, as discussed in Section 2.4,
multiple robots should be adopted.
2. After having reduced the graph G as described above, we compute the
shortest paths for any pair of targets t, t′ and we remove all the vertices
that do not belong to any shortest path. The idea is that if a vertex
z is not on any shortest path and a strategy σp prescribes that the
patroller can make action move(z) with strictly positive probability,
then it can be easily observed that, if the patroller does not make such
action, it cannot decrease its expected utility. Indeed, the probability
to reach any target t within d(t) turns cannot decrease since visiting z
would introduce an unnecessary temporal cost. In the case there are
multiple shortest paths between two targets, we keep all of them (in
some specific cases, we could select a particular shortest path as we
showed in [20]).
We call Gr = (Vr, Ar, T, v, d) the reduced graph produced as prescribed by
the two above steps. Graph Gr can be obtained in linear time in the size n
(number of vertices) of the patrolling setting, given the shortest paths. We
recall that these shortest paths have been already computed (by applying
Dijkstra’s algorithm) when our algorithm searched for the deterministic equi-
librium strategy. We report in Figure 7 the graph Gr for our running example
of Figure 1 after having removed the vertices corresponding to the dominated
actions move(i) of the patroller. The dominated actions are: move(i) with
i ∈ {04, 05, 09, 10, 15, 16, 17, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29}.
We now focus on the intruder’s actions. We recall that the actions of
the intruder are of the form enter-when(t, h), where t is a target and h is
a history, and stay-out. Considering l = 1, actions enter-when(t, h) reduce
to enter-when(t, i), with the meaning that the intruder enters target t after
it observed the patroller in vertex i. We consider only dominance between
actions enter-when(t, i). This means that, if action enter-when(t, i) is domi-
nated, the intruder will never attack t after having observed the patroller in
i and then such action can be discarded. We remove intruder’s dominated
actions in the following way.
Fixed a target t, enter-when(t, i) is dominated by another intruder’s ac-
tion enter-when(t, i′) if the patroller, when covering every path starting from
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Figure 7: Graph Gr for the patrolling setting of Figure 1, obtained by removing the
vertices corresponding to the patroller’s dominated actions.
i′ and arriving at t before d(t) turns, must always visit vertex i. The basic
idea is: the intruder’s expected utility for action enter-when(t, i) depends
on the probability that such action will lead to a successful intrusion. This
probability is related to the probability that the patroller reaches t within
d(t) turns from its current vertex i. It can be easily observed that, in the
case the patroller, starting from i′, must always visit i to reach t within d(t)
turns, the probability that the patroller reaches t starting from i within d(t)
turns is not smaller than the probability that the patroller reaches t from i′
within d(t) turns (it is a trivial application of Markov chains). Therefore,
the expected utility (for the intruder) of enter-when(t, i) is not larger than
the expected utility of enter-when(t, i′). This holds independently of the
patroller’s strategy. It can be easily observed, instead, that, given two dif-
ferent targets t1 and t2, actions enter-when(t1, i) and enter-when(t2, i
′) may
not have any dominance relationship for any possible i and i′ independently
of the patroller’s strategy.
Consider the example reported in Figure 7. Consider target 08 and ver-
tices 01 and 02. The probability that the patroller reaches target 08 within
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d(08) = 8 turns starting from 01 is not larger than the probability that the
patroller reaches target 08 within d(08) = 8 turns starting from 02. In-
deed, when the patroller starts from vertex 01, it must always pass through
vertex 02 to reach 08 by 8 turns. Therefore, the intruder will prefer to
play enter-when(08, 01) rather than enter-when(08, 02) independently of the
patroller’s strategy. This shows why, in this example, enter-when(08, 01)
dominates enter-when(08, 02) and this last action can be removed.
We call Vt ⊆ Vr the subset of vertices that satisfy the following condition:
for every i ∈ Vt action enter-when(t, i) is not dominated. Therefore, Vt
provides a compact representation of the non-dominated actions. Set Vt can
be found by resorting to tree search techniques in the following way. We
denote by q a node in the search tree and by η(q) the vertex corresponding
to q. We build a tree of paths where, called q0 the root, η(q0) = t and a
node q′′ is a successor of q′ if and only if q′′ ∈ {q s.t. a(η(q′), η(q)) = 1}
and q′′ 6= q′ and q′′ 6= father(q′). The maximum depth of the tree is d(t).
That is, we consider all the paths not longer than d(t) and with t as first
vertex. Figure 8 reports the tree of paths generated for t = 06. Given a tree
of paths so built, an action enter-when(t, i) is dominated when there exists
a vertex i′ such that for each q with η(q) = i there is a q′ with η(q′) = i′
and father(q′) = q. In this case, i 6∈ Vt. In Figure 8, black nodes denote
vertices i such that actions enter-when(06, i) are dominated; for example,
action enter-when(06, 13) is dominated since every occurrence of vertex 13
in the search tree has a node with vertex 14 as child. The computational
complexity of removing intruder’s dominated actions is O(|T |bmaxt∈T {d(t)})
where T is the set of targets, b is the largest number of outbound arcs from
a target, and maxt∈T{d(t)} is the largest penetration time.
To summarize, the results produced by the first step of our algorithm are:
• a reduced patrolling setting Gr, obtained fromG by removing some ver-
tices and their corresponding arcs that represent patroller’s dominated
actions,
• for each t ∈ T a subset of vertices Vt, containing the vertices such that
every action enter-when(t, i) with i ∈ Vt is not dominated.
4.2.3. Mathematical Programming Formulation
In this section, we illustrate the second and the third step of our algo-
rithm. We present them together since they are conceptually similar, being
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Figure 8: Search tree for finding dominated actions for target 06 of Figure 7.
both based on mathematical programming. The solution of the mathemat-
ical programming problem is the non-deterministic equilibrium patrolling
strategy we are looking for. More precisely, we provide two mathematical
programming formulations, one for each step of the algorithm, whose solu-
tion can be obtained using optimization software tools, e.g., [44]. As before,
we provide our mathematical formulations when |h| = l = 1. With l = 1, the
Markov hypothesis holds and the patroller’s strategy {α〈i〉,move(j)} introduced
in Section 2.3 can be compactly represented by {αi,j} ∀i, j ∈ Vr, where each
αi,j denotes the probability for the patroller to move from vertex i to vertex
j (namely, to take action move(j) while in i). Our formulation is inspired
by [41] and introduces some non-linearities [42]. More precisely, given a pure
strategy of the intruder σi = a, the maximization of the patroller’s expected
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utility is linear in the objective and bilinear in the constraints. The non-
linearity is due to the symmetries of our game model that are introduced
by the Markov hypothesis: we need to constrain behavioral strategies1 to
be equal in the same state, i.e., αi,j is fixed for all the decision nodes for
which the patroller’s current vertex is i. This non-linearity forces us to avoid
a mixed integer formulation (as in [8]) that, in our case, would be a mixed
integer non-linear problem whose efficient solution is still an open issue in
the operational research field. In order to have the minimal non-linear degree
(i.e., quadratic degree) we took inspiration form the sequence-form proposed
in [45].
We now present the details of the second step of our algorithm where
we check whether there exists at least one patroller’s strategy σp such that
stay-out is a best response for the intruder. If such a strategy exists, then the
patroller will follow it, being its utility maximum when the intruder abstains
from the intrusion (recall the utility definition of Section 2.2). This step is
formulated as a bilinear feasibility problem in which αi,js are the decision
variables. We denote by Vr \ i the set obtained by removing element i from
set Vr and by γ
w,t
i,j the probability that the patroller reaches vertex j in w
steps, starting from vertex i and not sensing (i.e., not passing through) target
t. The feasibility problem is the following:
αi,j ≥ 0 ∀i, j ∈ Vr (6)X
j∈Vr
αi,j = 1 ∀i ∈ Vr (7)
αi,j ≤ ar(i, j) ∀i, j ∈ Vr (8)
γ
1,t
i,j = αi,j ∀t ∈ T, i, j ∈ Vr , j 6= t (9)
γ
w,t
i,j =
X
x∈Vr\t
“
γ
w−1,t
i,x αx,j
”
∀w ∈ {2, . . . , d(t)}, ∀t ∈ T, i, j ∈ Vr , j 6= t (10)
ui(intruder-capture)
0
@1−
X
i∈Vr\t
γ
d(t),t
z,i
1
A+
+ui(penetration-t)
X
i∈Vr\t
γ
d(t),t
z,i ≤ 0
∀t ∈ T, z ∈ Vt (11)
Constraints (6)-(7) express that probabilities αi,js are well defined; con-
straints (8) express that the patroller can only move between two adjacent
1We recall that a behavioral strategy of an agent in a given decision node is the strategy
conditioned by the agent being at such node.
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vertices; constraints (9)-(10) express the Markov hypothesis over the pa-
troller’s decision policy; constraints (11) express that no action enter-when(t, z)
gives to the intruder an expected utility larger than that of stay-out. The
non-linearity is due to constraints (10). If the above problem admits a so-
lution, the resulting αi,js are the optimal patrolling strategy. We notice
that, due to constraints (10), the above feasibility problem is not convex and
we cannot linearize it by applying Karush-Khun-Tucker theorem (see Sec-
tion 4.1). When no dominated action can be removed, the problem presents
O(mn2maxt∈T {d(t)}) variables and constraints (where n is the number of
vertices in G and m is the number of targets). In practical settings, re-
moving dominated actions drastically reduces the number of variables and
constraints, as we shall show in Section 4.3.
We now discuss the relationships between this second step of our algo-
rithm to compute non-deterministic equilibrium strategies and the algorithm
presented in Section 3 to compute deterministic equilibrium strategies. The
similarities between these two algorithms are due to the fact that they both
produce patrolling strategies (if they exist) such that the intruder’s best
response is stay-out. Anyway, their scope is different and they are both
necessary. Indeed, if there exists a deterministic equilibrium strategy with
|h| = l > 1, the above mathematical programming problem fails in finding it,
since it is not Markovian, and such strategy can be found only applying the
algorithm of Section 3. On the other side, when no deterministic equilibrium
strategy exists, there could be a non-deterministic equilibrium strategy such
that the intruder’s best response is stay-out. Obviously, an extension of the
above formulation with l very large would make the algorithm for the com-
putation of deterministic equilibrium strategies unnecessary. However, such
a formulation is expected to be hardly solvable in practice.
When the above feasibility problem does not admit any solution (i.e.,
there is not any patroller’s strategy such that stay-out is a best response for
the intruder), we pass to the third step of the algorithm. In this step, we find
the best response of the intruder such that the patroller can maximize its
expected utility. This problem is formulated as a multi-bilinear programming
problem. The single bilinear problem, in which enter-when(s, q) with s ∈ T
and q ∈ Vs is assumed to be the intruder’s best response, is defined as:
max up(penetration-s)
X
i∈Vr\s
γ
d(s),s
q,i + up(intruder-capture)
0
@1−
X
i∈Vr\s
γ
d(s),s
q,i
1
A
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s.t.
constraints (6)-(10)
ui(intruder-capture)
0
@ X
i∈Vr\t
γ
d(t),t
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γ
d(s),s
q,i
1
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+ui(penetration-s)
X
i∈Vr\s
γ
d(s),s
q,i − ui(penetration-t)
X
i∈Vr\t
γ
d(t),t
z,i ≥ 0
∀t ∈ T, z ∈ Vt (12)
The objective function maximizes the patroller’s expected utility. Con-
straints (12) express that no action enter-when(t, z) gives a larger value to
the intruder than action enter-when(s, q). When no dominated action can
be discarded, we can formulate m ·n above problems for all the possible ac-
tions enter-when(s, q) with s ∈ T, q ∈ Vr. Practically, the number of bilinear
problems to be considered is usually much smaller thanks to elimination of
dominated actions. The size, in terms of variables and constraints, of each
optimization problem is the same of the feasibility problem of the second
step of our algorithm. If a bilinear problem is feasible, its solution is a
set of probabilities {αi,j}, that define a possible patrolling strategy. If the
problem is unfeasible, then there is not any patroller’s strategy such that
enter-when(s, q) is a best response for the intruder. From all the solutions
of feasible problems, we pick out the one that gives the patroller the maxi-
mum expected utility. As a final step, we need to check whether or not all
the targets can be covered by the strategy. This can be easily accomplished
by inspecting the randomized strategy. If all the targets can be covered
with a strictly positive probability, the produced strategy is the optimal
non-deterministic strategy for our patrolling setting that corresponds to the
leader-follower equilibrium strategy. In the other case, there does not exist
(with l = 1) any non-deterministic equilibrium strategy that can cover all
the targets.
We report in Figure 9 the transition probabilities corresponding to the
leader-follower equilibrium for the setting of Figure 7. The intruder’s best
response is enter-when(08, 12).
It is worth a comment on how the size of the problem changes when l = 2.
In this case, variables αs are defined as αh,z with h = 〈i, j〉 representing the
probability that the patroller moves to vertex z after history h and variables
γ are defined as γw,t
h0,h
, with h0 = 〈i0, j0〉 and h = 〈i, j〉, representing the prob-
ability that the patroller reaches vertex j from vertex i in w steps, starting
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Figure 9: Optimal patrolling strategy for Figure 7.
after history h0 and not passing through target t. The constraints with l = 2
are similar to those with l = 1. The problem presents O(mn4maxt∈T{d(t)})
variables and constraints.
4.2.4. Improving Efficiency in Strictly Competitive Settings
Strictly competitive games are two-player games with specific constraints
over players’ preferences [10]. Call i and −i the two players. In strictly
competitive games we have that for each possible pair of game outcomes
x, y if ui(x) > ui(y), then u−i(x) < u−i(y), and vice versa. Therefore, in a
strictly competitive game, if ui(x) = ui(y) for two outcomes x and y, then it
necessarily must be that u−i(x) = u−i(y). Zero sum games are a specific class
of strictly competitive games. If a game is strictly competitive, its resolution
is easier than when it is not. This is because, with strictly competitive
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games, von Neuman’s theorem assures that the maxmin,2 minmax,3 and
equilibrium (both Nash and leader-follower) strategies are the same [10] and
it turns out that computing maxmin and minmax strategies is much easier
than computing an equilibrium strategy (Nash or refinements). As we shall
show in this section, in a strictly competitive setting, the second and the third
step of our algorithm collapse to a unique bilinear optimization problem of
the size of the feasibility problem (6)-(11) of Section 4.2.3.
Our patrolling game can be studied as a strictly competitive game when
for all targets i, j ∈ T we have that, if vp(i) ≥ vp(j), then vi(i) ≥ vi(j),
and vice versa. Essentially we are requiring that both the patroller and the
intruder have the same preference ordering over the targets. This assumption
appears reasonable in a large number of practical settings, especially when
values of the targets are common values. Rigorously speaking, when the
above constraints hold, the game is not a strictly competitive game. This
is because two outcomes (i.e., intruder-capture and no-attack) provide the
patroller with the same utility and the intruder with two (in general) different
utilities (i.e., −ǫ and 0, respectively). Anyway, we can temporarily discard
the outcome no-attack, assuming that action stay-out will not be played by
the intruder. We shall reconsider such action in the following. Without the
outcome no-attack and with the above constraints over the agents’ valuations
of the targets, the game is strictly competitive. We provide a mathematical
programming formulation to find the patroller’s minmax strategy, namely,
the strategy that minimizes the intruder’s expected utility and, the game
being strictly competitive, maximizes the patroller’s utility. We call u the
minmax value, i.e., the expected utility of the intruder. The mathematical
programming formulation is the following:
minu
s.t.
constraints (6)-(10)
ui(intruder-capture)
0
@1−
X
i∈Vr\t
γ
d(t),t
z,i
1
A+ ui(penetration-t)
X
i∈Vr\t
γ
d(t),t
z,i ≤ u ∀t ∈ T, z ∈ Vt (13)
2The maxmin strategy of player i is the strategy that maximizes i’s expected utility
given that all the opponents happen to play the strategies which cause the greatest harm
to i.
3The minmax strategy of player i is the strategy that minimizes the −i’s expected
utility.
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Constraints (13) assure that all the intruder’s actions provide it with at
most u expected utility. It can be easily observed that the size, in terms
of variables and constraints, of this mathematical programming problem is
O(mn2mint∈T {d(t)}), which is the same of the feasibility problem of the
second step of our algorithm for general, non-strictly competitive, games
(see previous section).
Now, we reconsider action stay-out and its corresponding outcome no-
attack. The basic idea is that the intruder will play stay-out if it pays better
than any other action. Furthermore, the intruder knows that the utility
of making stay-out independently of the patroller’s strategy is 0. A simple
approach is to solve the above mathematical programming problem and to
compare u with respect to 0: if u < 0, then the intruder will play stay-out,
otherwise it will not. Therefore, in a strictly competitive setting, the second
and the third step of our algorithm collapse to the resolution of a unique
optimization problem plus a comparison between u and 0.
4.2.5. Theoretical Properties
In this section we report some theoretical properties of our algorithm. At
first we focus on l. We show that when the topology is fully connected the pa-
troller receives the largest expected utility with any l ≥ l = 0. Subsequently,
we show that, in arbitrary settings, the value l such that the patroller’s
expected utility is maximum is larger than 1 and therefore the Markovian
equilibrium strategy we calculate is not the best one for the patroller. Finally,
we show that, when searching for a non-deterministic equilibrium strategy,
we cannot reduce the graph G to a graph G′ where all the non-target vertices
are removed as we have done in Section 3.
We start by discussing l. We show that when the environment has a fully
connected topology then l = 0. We state the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For a fully connected topology, l = 0.
Proof sketch. We prove that, in an environment with fully connected topol-
ogy, our algorithm produces the same leader-follower equilibrium when l = 0
and l = 1. We consider the basic case with three vertices denoted by {1, 2, 3},
d(i) = 2 for any vertex i where agents are risk neutral. The proof in the
general case with more complex patrolling settings and with l > 1 is a gen-
eralization and we omit it. Suppose l = 1. Consider the bilinear program-
ming problem of Section 4.2.3 in which the best response of the intruder
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is supposed to be enter-when(2, 1). The objective function can be writ-
ten as
∑
i 6=2 vp(i) · (1 − p) +
∑
i vp(i) · p where p = α1,2 + α1,1α1,2 + α1,3α3,2
is the probability to capture the intruder in vertex 2. Since
∑
i vp(i) ≥∑
i 6=2 vp(i), the maximization of the objective function can be reduced to
the maximization of p. We denote by EUi(j) agent i’s expected utility
from making action j. The constraints are (a) EUi(enter-when(2, 1)) ≥
EUi(enter-when(2, 2)) and EUi(enter-when(2, 1)) ≥ EUi(enter-when(2, 3)),
and (b) EUi(enter-when(2, 1)) ≥ EUi(enter-when(i, j)) for i ∈ {1, 3} and
for j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Consider the first constraint of (a). It can be writ-
ten as (with the same reduction used for the objective function): α1,2 +
α1,1α1,2 + α1,3α3,2 ≤ α2,2 + α2,1α1,2 + α2,3α3,2. The second constraint of (a)
can be written analogously. Since the objective of the patroller is to max-
imize α1,2 + α1,1α1,2 + α1,3α3,2, we have that the maximum is when either
α1,2 = α2,2 = α3,2 = 0 or αi,j = αk,j for all i, j, k. The first option is not
possible, since it prescribes that the patroller never patrols vertex 2 knowing
that the best response of the intruder is to enter vertex 2. Thus, the second
option holds. Under this option, the mathematical problem reduces to the
one with l = 0 and therefore they admit the same solution. In the situation in
which constraints (b) are more strict than constraints (a), the corresponding
problem with l = 0 results unfeasible and there is an action of the intruder
such that the utility expected by the patroller is larger than that expected
when enter-when(2, 1) (against the assumption that this is the best response
for the intruder). 
With other topologies, it is generally l ≥ 1. To see it, let us consider, the
setting of Figure 1 with the penetration times reported in Figure 4(b). Such
a patrolling problem admits a deterministic equilibrium strategy as showed
in Section 3 and therefore the patroller can preserve all the value, forcing the
intruder to make stay-out. Now, suppose to apply the mathematical program-
ming formulation of Section 4.2.3 to such problem. Being that formulation
based on the assumption that l = 1, the probability that the intruder will
be captured when it makes, e.g., enter-when(06, 23) is strictly lower than 1.
Indeed, the values α11,i with i ∈ {06, 12, 18} are strictly positive to assure
that the patroller can cover all the targets. Then, by Markov chains, it fol-
lows that the probability that the patroller reaches vertex 06 starting from
vertex 23 within 9 turns is strictly lower than 1. We can always find a strictly
positive value of the penalty to be captured ǫ such that, when the patroller
follows the Markovian strategy, the intruder strictly prefers to attack a target
rather than not to attack. Since the intruder will attack and the probability
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of being captured is strictly lower than 1, the utility expected by the pa-
troller from following the Markovian strategy (with l = 1) will be strictly
lower than that expected utility from following the deterministic equilibrium
strategy (for which l is indefinitely large). As this example shows, in general
l > 1.
Now, we show that, in looking for a non-deterministic equilibrium pa-
trolling strategy, we cannot study a patrolling setting considering only the
targets and neglecting other vertices that connect them. We state the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 4.2. A non-deterministic patrolling strategy σp that is defined
only on the space of the targets and prescribes that the patroller moves between
targets along the shortest paths may be not optimal for the patroller.
To show that this proposition holds, consider again our running example
depicted in Figure 1. Suppose that σp is defined only on the targets, i.e., αi,j
is defined only when i, j ∈ T , and that the patroller moves between targets
along the shortest paths. Since the intruder can attack a target both when
the patroller is in a target and when it is moving along the paths, it can be
easily observed that the patroller looses expected utility with respect to the
situation where σp is defined on all the vertices. Indeed, the intruder can
wait observing the actions of the patroller and deciding the turn in which to
enter. Suppose that the intruder attacks vertex 18 after the patroller moved
in vertex 21 from vertex 18. Since the patroller’s strategy is defined only on
the targets, it means that the patroller is going either 08 or 14. In both these
two cases, the patroller will spend 6 turns. Then the patroller could came
back to 18, but it needs more than 2 turns. Thus, if the intruder attacks 18
after the patroller moved in 21 from 18, then the intruder will surely have
success in its attack. This does not happen when σp is defined on all the
vertices Vr.
4.3. Experimental Evaluation
In this section we discuss the performance achieved by our algorithm in
computing a non-deterministic equilibrium strategy. Differently from the
experimental evaluation of the algorithm for computing a deterministic pa-
trolling strategy presented in Section 3.5, the patrolling settings we tested
here are not randomly generated, but have been carefully handcrafted to
highlight some characteristics of our approach. Since the algorithm to find
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the non-deterministic strategy is much more computationally expensive than
that employed in the deterministic case, the resolution of a large number of
randomly generated instances would be computationally intractable, intro-
ducing difficulties in performing a good experimental evaluation. Further-
more, our main objective in this phase is not only to assess the absolute
performance achieved by our algorithm, but also to evaluate the relative
improvements that the reduction based on dominance of actions and the
possibility to exploit a strictly competitive formulation could introduce. For
these reasons, we conducted experiments on a number of patrolling settings,
built with the aim of reproducing common situations that are likely to be
found in real world applications. We assume agents to be risk neutral. For
each setting we computed the non-deterministic equilibrium strategy with
and without the reduction of dominated actions. Moreover, we also evalu-
ated the performance when the setting allows one to compute the strategy
using a strictly competitive formulation. In order to perform this last set of
experiments, we modified functions vp and vi in the patrolling settings for
which the requirements described in Section 4.2.4 are not satisfied. All the
algorithms have been coded in C and the optimization problems have been
formulated in the AMPL [46] syntax and solved with the SNOPT [44] solver.
Tests were conducted on a Linux (2.6.24 kernel) computer with a DUAL
QUAD CORE Intel XEON 2.33 GHz CPU, 8 GB RAM, and 4 MB cache
In order to have a fair evaluation, the considered patrolling settings are
such that no equilibrium patrolling strategy inducing stay-out as the in-
truder’s best response could be found. In other words, to find the equi-
librium patrolling strategy, all the three steps composing the algorithm for
non-deterministic patrolling strategies need to be executed. We do not report
the computational time spent for the removal of dominated actions, since it
is negligible, being in all the settings shorter than one second. In Table 2, we
report the experimental results related to our running example of Figure 1.
We consider four different configurations: ‘complete’ refers to the basic case
in which no dominated action is removed, ‘reduced p’ refers to the case in
which only patroller’s dominated actions are removed, ‘reduced p, i’ refers to
the case in which all the dominated actions are removed, and ‘sc’ refers to
the strictly competitive setting. We report the following data: ‘total time’ is
the computational time, ‘opt. prob.’ is the number of optimization problems
to be solved, ‘average time’ is the average computational times to solve a
single optimization problem, ‘max time’ and ‘min time’ are the largest and
the shortest, respectively, computational time to solve a single optimization
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problem, ‘std dev.’ is the standard deviation. We report in Figures 10, 11,
12, 13, and 14 the graph representations of other patrolling settings and the
corresponding experimental results. In these cases, ‘reduced p’ is omitted,
since no patroller’s action is dominated.
complete reduced p reduced p, i sc
total time > 48 h 31 h 21 min 25 s 29 min 13 s 48 s
opt. prob. 812 240 30 1
average time - 7 min 54 s 58 s −
max time - 10 h 4 min 52 s 1 min 49 s −
min time - 46 s 8 s −
std dev. - 51 min 55 s 3 min 16 s −
Table 2: Results for the running example of Figure 1.
01
d(01) = 10
(.05,.5)
02 03 04
05
d(05) = 6
(.45,.8)
06
10
d(10) = 10
(.35,.6)
09 08 07
complete reduced p, i sc
total time 9 min 14 s 28 s 3.5 s
opt. prob. 90 16 1
average time 5 s 5 s −
max time 9 s 10 s −
min time < 1 s 3 s −
std dev. 1 s 2 s −
Figure 10: Results for a corridor-like setting with 10 vertices.
As it can be seen for all the settings, when no reduction is applied, the
computational time needed to find the solution is very large. Indeed, a con-
siderable number of optimization problems have to be solved, most of which
are not necessary, being associated to intruder’s dominated actions. More-
over, each optimization problem is also characterized by many constraints
and variables. Results show a remarkable improvement in performance when
the reduction of the patrolling setting based on dominated actions is applied
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01
d(01) = 9
(.05,.5)
02
15 03
14 04
13
d(13) = 9
(.35,.6)
05
12 06
11 10 09 08
07
d(07) = 7
(.45,.8)
complete reduced p, i sc
total time 3 h 38 min 11 min 49 s 49 s
opt. prob. 240 32 1
average time 57 s 44 s −
max time 1 min 28 s 95 s −
min time 28 s 10 s −
std dev. 10 s 16 s −
Figure 11: Results for a ring-like setting with 15 vertices.
before computing the solution. An average 96% reduction of the computa-
tional time was observed over all the settings for the non-strictly competitive
case. This significant decreasing in the total computational time is directly
related to the smaller number of optimization problems to be solved. How-
ever, a lower average time for the single problem has been obtained too. If we
consider that the time needed to perform the reduction of dominated actions
is negligible, such a pre-processing phase becomes of paramount importance
for making our approach applicable, especially in complex patrolling settings.
Finally, in all the settings the best performance is achieved when using the
strictly competitive formulation. Such a significant improvement is obviously
due to the fact that only a single (and reduced) optimization problem needs
to be solved. Despite this kind of formulation can be exploited only in specific
cases, it constitutes a promising direction for the resolution of very complex
patrolling settings.
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09
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15 12 11
16
d(16) = 9
(.6,.6)
14
d(14) = 8
(.7,.8)
13
d(13) = 8
(.3,.5)
complete reduced p, i sc
total time 35 h 11 min 27 min 14 s 1 min 3 s
opt. prob. 240 32 1
average time 8 min 12 s 51 s −
max time 4 h 22 min 3 min 41 s −
min time 1 s 34 s −
std dev. 36 min 53 s 31 s −
Figure 12: Results for a tree-like setting with 16 vertices.
01 02
03
d(03) = 6
(.25,.4)
04 05
06
d(06) = 4
(.35,.5)
07 08
09 10
11
d(11) = 6
(.25,.4)
12
d(12) = 5
(.25,.4)
13
complete reduced p, i sc
total time 6 h 9 min 26 min 49 s 6 s
opt. prob. 156 16 1
average time 1 min 25 s 1 min 9 s −
max time 5 min 1 s 2 min 31 s −
min time 1 s 46 s −
std dev. 30 s 21 s −
Figure 13: Results for a eight-like setting with 13 vertices.
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d(05) = 8
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d(11) = 8
(.05,.3)
12
13 14
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16
d(16) = 9
(.45,.8)
17
18
d(18) = 8
(.35,.6)
19 20
complete reduced p, i sc
total time 46 h 52 min 1 h 53 min 4 min 45 s
opt. prob. 380 28 1
average time 6 min 59 s 4 min 1 s −
max time 2 h 54 min 9 min 51 s −
min time 2 min 38 s 1 min 42 s −
std dev. 8 min 29 s 1 min 43 s −
Figure 14: Results for a eight-like setting with 20 vertices.
5. Extending the Framework
In this section, we discuss how our framework can be extended to capture
some more realistic aspects and to improve its efficiency in finding a patrolling
strategy. First, we enrich the expressiveness of the framework (Section 5.1)
and, then, we propose some improvements for the algorithms (Section 5.2).
5.1. Enriching Framework Expressiveness
We discuss how the framework expressiveness can be improved captur-
ing the following situations. We introduce uncertainty over the intruder’s
valuations (Section 5.1.1) and over the intruder’s penetration times (Sec-
tion 5.1.2), and we enrich the patroller sensing capabilities (Section 5.1.3).
Then we extend the intruder’s movement model (Section 5.1.4), we introduce
delay on intruder’s entering (Section 5.1.5), we introduce intruder’s partial
observability over patroller’s actions (Section 5.1.6), and we consider the sit-
uation in which there are multiple patrolling robots (Section 5.1.7). For each
extension, we discuss its impact on the model and on the computation of
deterministic and non-deterministic equilibrium strategies.
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5.1.1. Uncertainty over Intruder’s Valuations
We consider the situation wherein the patroller does not know with cer-
tainty the intruder’s valuations vis over the targets.
Model According to Harsanyi’s transformation [10], a game with uncertain
information is cast to a game with imperfect information. More pre-
cisely, each player can be of different types, each one with different
values of the payoffs, and the players do not perfectly observe the ac-
tual type of the opponents, e.g., see [8]. In our patrolling game, the
intruder could be of different types θj ∈ Θi, each one with specific val-
uations vi(i, θj) over target i and penalty ǫj for being captured. Each
intruder’s type θj is assigned a probability ωj . The intruder strategy
σi must define a strategy for each type of intruder.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation No extension is required. In-
deed, the algorithm for the computation of the deterministic equilib-
rium strategy described in Section 3 does not depend on the intruder’s
valuations.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation The step of the algorithm
that computes the dominated actions does not require any extension,
since it does not depend on the intruder’s valuations. Considering the
non-strictly competitive case, the bilinear mathematical programming
formulation must be extended as follows. We need to compute the best
patroller’s strategy for each profile of actions of intruder’s types, e.g.,
with two intruder’s types for each 〈enter-when(i1, h1), enter-when(i2, h2)〉
where ij, hj corresponds to the j-th type. This requires the introduc-
tion of constraints for each intruder’s type in the mathematical pro-
gramming problem. As a results, both the number of constraints and
the number of mathematical programming problems to be solved in-
crease with a power of the number of types |Θi|. This makes the exact
resolution of real-world settings impractical and pushes for finding ap-
proximated algorithms. Let us consider the strictly competitive case.
By definition, the intruder’s valuations can be any under the constraint
that they are strictly competitive with respect to the patroller’s ones.
In the case all the possible intruder’s types have valuations that are
strictly competitive with respect to the patroller’s ones, we can ignore
the intruder’s types and we study the game as a classical strictly com-
petitive game where the intruder’s valuations are those of a possible
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type. This makes the exact resolution of significant complex settings
affordable.
5.1.2. Uncertainty over Intruder’s Penetration Times
We consider the situation wherein penetration times of the intruder are
uncertain due to the fact that the environment is not perfectly predictable
or modeled.
Model Each target t’s penetration time d(t) is described by a discrete prob-
ability distribution, e.g.,
d(06) =


8 with probability 0.3
9 with probability 0.4
10 with probability 0.3
.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation For each target, we consider
the shortest possible penetration time according to the given probabil-
ity distribution (8, in the example above). Beyond that, the algorithm
works as in the basic case, but considering such penetration time.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation For each target, we con-
sider the largest possible penetration time according to the given prob-
ability distribution (10, in the example above). The computation of
the dominated actions works as in the basic case, but using such pen-
etration time. The mathematical programming formulations, for both
the non-strictly competitive and the strictly competitive cases, must be
extended as follows. The value of w in constraints (10) is in the range
{2, . . . ,max(d(t))}, where max(d(t)) is the largest possible penetration
time for target t according to the given probability distribution. The
computation of the intruder’s expected utility in constraints (11) must
we weighted with the probabilities of the possible values of d(t). The
number of constraints and the number of optimization problems to be
solved is the same as in the basic case.
5.1.3. Augmented Patroller’s Sensing Capabilities
We consider the situation wherein patroller’s sensing capabilities are aug-
mented. A more detailed description of this situation can be found in [22].
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Model The model has been already described in Section 2.1 and uses a
generic function S( · , · ) to model the sensing capabilities of the pa-
troller.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation This kind of strategy can be
computed only if we consider sensing with probability of one. Formally,
we require that S(i, j) = 0 or S(i, j) = 1 for all vertices i and j. The
generation of the reduced graph G′ must be modified to consider S.
In practice, G′ is composed also of additional vertices that are on the
boundary of the sensing range with respect to a target, i.e., the farthest
vertices from which the patroller can sense the target. The algorithm
can then be easily extended to work on this graph.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation In the computation of
the dominated actions, action enter-when(i, j) is dominated by action
enter-when(i, k) if it results to be dominated according to the algo-
rithm provided in Section 4.2.2 and S(j, i) ≥ S(j, k). The mathemat-
ical programming problems (for both the non-strictly competitive and
the strictly competitive cases) can be easily modified to capture prob-
abilistic augmented sensing capabilities. More precisely, the right term
of constraints (10) and (11) must be multiplied by 1 − S(i, j). This
does not increase the number of constraints and the number of op-
timization problems to be solved in the non-strictly competitive case
and, as shown in [22], no significant additional computational time is
needed to address this extension.
5.1.4. Refinements on Intruder’s Movement Model
We extend the movement model of the intruder. A more detailed descrip-
tion of this extension can be found in [23].
Model We enrich the model by introducing access areas, which are special
vertices, constraining the intruder to move along paths connecting ac-
cess areas to targets, and allowing the patroller to capture the intruder
also along these paths. As it is often the case in pursuit-evasion, we
assume that the intruder can move infinitely fast. Therefore, covering
a path takes only one turn, regardless of its length. The intruder’s ac-
tions are now of the form enter-when(p, i) where p is a path connecting
an access area to a target. By employing search trees the minimal set
of paths to be considered can be computed.
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Deterministic Equilibrium Computation The algorithm is exactly the
same we described in Section 3 except for the special case in which all
the possible intruder’s paths share a common vertex. In this case, the
optimal strategy for the patroller is obviously to stay forever in such
vertex.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation In the computation of
the dominated actions, action enter-when(p, j) is dominated by action
enter-when(p, k) if it results to be dominated according to the algo-
rithm provided in Section 4.2.2 and k is not adjacent to any vertex of
p. The mathematical programming problems (both non-strictly com-
petitive and strictly competitive) can be easily modified to capture
intruder’s movement along paths. More precisely, the right term of
constraints (10) must consider that all the vertices belonging to p are
sensed when w = 1. This does not increase the number of constraints
and the number of optimization problems to be solved in the non-
strictly competitive case and, as shown in [23], no significant additional
computational time is required to address this extension.
5.1.5. Delay on Intruder’s Entering
We consider the situation wherein there is a delay between the turn at
which the intruder decides to enter and the turn at which it actually enters.
A more detailed description of this situation can be found in [22].
Model We introduce a delay D ∈ N+ between the turn at which the intruder
decides to enter a target t and the turn at which it actually enters t.
A probability distribution can be defined over this delay.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation No modification is required
with respect to the algorithm described in Section 3.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation In the computation of
the dominated actions, we need to add delay D to the penetration
times of each target. The mathematical programming problems (both
non-strictly competitive and strictly competitive) must be modified
as follows. Constraints (10) must be rewritten considering that the
range of w is {D + 1, . . . , D + d(t)}. We need to introduce constraints
similar to constraints (11) with w in {2, . . . , D}. These constraints
enable to derive an estimate on the position of the patroller at the
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turn in which the intruder enters. This extension makes the range of w
longer, introducing additional constraints; however, as shown in [22],
no significant additional computational time is needed to address this
extension.
5.1.6. Intruder’s Partial Observation over Patroller’s Actions
We consider the situation wherein the intruder, when it decides to enter,
can partially observe the position of the patroller. A more detailed descrip-
tion of this situation can be found in [23].
Model As in Section 5.1.4, we enrich the model by introducing access areas
and constraining the intruder to enter the patrolling setting through
these access areas. We assign each access area a view over the vertices,
i.e., the set of vertices that can be observed from such access area.
Since the intruder cannot perfectly observe the position of the patroller
when it enters and can enter when the patroller is out of the view of the
intruder, we need to redefine the intruder’s action space. Specifically,
we define a state s = 〈j, k〉 where j is a vertex and k is an integer
denoting time. The meaning of s is: at the last observation, k turns
before, the patroller was in vertex j. Thus, the intruder’s actions are
enter-when(i, s), where i is a target and s is a state.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation No modification is required
with respect to the algorithm described in Section 3.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation We need to redefine the
computation of the dominated actions to take into account the possi-
bility that the intruder enters when the patroller is not observable. In
principle, the intruder’s actions are infinite, being infinite the values
that k can assume in s. Anyway, it can be shown that only a finite
number of actions are non dominated. That is, we can safely con-
sider a finite number of values for k. The mathematical programming
problems must be modified in a way similar to that of Section 5.1.5. In-
deed, to compute the patroller’s best strategy when the intruder makes
enter-when(i, s) with s = 〈j, k〉 and k > 0, we need to estimate the
position of the patroller. This estimation is based on the patroller’s
strategy. As shown in [23], addressing this extension can require sig-
nificant additional computational time.
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5.1.7. Multiple Patrolling Robots
We consider the situation wherein there are multiple patrolling robots. A
more detailed description of this situation can be found in [21].
Model Multiple robots can be easily captured in the model by exploiting
patroller’s augmented sensing capabilities. Let us assume that the en-
vironment is a perimeter and that the robots move together in a syn-
chronized fashion (i.e., at each turn they all move clockwise or coun-
terclockwise, as in [7]). We can define a fictitious single robot with
an appropriate S(i, j) such that it senses all the vertices that the real
robots would sense. In the general case, we can model the position
of the robots as a tuple and their actions as a joint action. The in-
truder’s actions are of the form enter-when(i, 〈j1, . . . , jg〉) where jr is
the position of the r-th robot.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation The algorithm described in Sec-
tion 3 must be modified as follows. The solution is a tuple of strategies,
one for each specific robot. That is, the algorithm produces a tuple of
cycles. At each step of the search tree, the algorithm builds upon the
current partial solution by adding a target to the strategy of each robot.
This target will be different for each robot.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation The determination of the
intruder’s dominated actions must consider the presence of multiple
robots. Specifically, the algorithm presented in Section 4.2.2 must be
repeated for each patrolling robot. An action is dominated if it is dom-
inated with respect to all the robots. The number of constraints in the
mathematical programming problems (for both the non-strictly com-
petitive and the strictly competitive cases) increases since the intruder’s
space of actions is larger. The number of optimization problems to be
solved in the non-strictly competitive case increases exponentially with
g (the number of robots). The considerations on computational time
are similar to those reported in Section 5.1.1.
5.2. Improving Algorithms
In this section, we discuss how our solving algorithm can be extended
to situations in which the optimal patrolling strategy does not cover all the
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targets (Section 5.2.1) and how approximated solutions can be found (Sec-
tion 5.2.2). For each extension, we discuss its impact on the computation of
deterministic (when applicable) and non-deterministic equilibria.
5.2.1. Computing Non-Full Coverage Strategies
We consider the situation in which the optimal strategy does not cover
all the targets and we cannot introduce additional patrolling robots.
Deterministic Equilibrium Computation In this case, the aim is to de-
termine the subset of targets to be patrolled such that the patroller’s
utility is the largest. This can be accomplished by removing iteratively
the targets in increasing order of patroller’s utility and searching at
each iteration for a deterministic equilibrium strategy as prescribed in
Section 3. The algorithm stops when it finds a subset of targets that
admits a deterministic equilibrium strategy.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation No extension is required
for the computation of the intruder’s dominated actions. The computa-
tion of the non-deterministic equilibrium strategy can be accomplished
iteratively similarly to the computation of the deterministic equilib-
rium strategy. More precisely, initially all the targets are considered.
If the leader-follower equilibrium strategy is such that some target t is
not covered, then we apply our algorithm to a new patrolling problem
where target t is removed.
5.2.2. Searching for ǫ-Equilibria
We consider the problem of computing approximate solutions for the
mathematical programming problems that find the non-deterministic equi-
librium.
Non-Deterministic Equilibrium Computation The hardness of the prob-
lem of searching for an exact leader-follower equilibrium can be relaxed
by looking at approximated equilibria, called ǫ-equilibria. A strategy
is an ǫ-equilibrium if each player cannot increase its expected utility
more than ǫ by making an off-equilibrium action. The literature pro-
vides several algorithms to compute these equilibria, but only few of
them are applicable for leader-follower settings, see, e.g., [47]. Thus,
this remains an open problem.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a formal framework for addressing the
problem of finding optimal patrolling strategies for a mobile robot moving in
an environment to prevent intrusions. The proposed approach is based on
the idea of modeling a patrolling situation as a game, played by the patroller
and the intruder, and of studying its equilibria to derive the optimal pa-
trolling strategy. The approach is more general than other game theoretical
approaches presented in literature, since it deals with environments with ar-
bitrary topology and with arbitrary preferences for the agents. Starting from
the formal definitions of a patrolling setting and of the associated game, the
main contributions of the paper have been algorithms for finding equilibrium
patrolling strategies both in a deterministic and in a non-deterministic form.
In the first case, the equilibrium patrolling strategy is a fixed path that, when
followed by the patrolling robot, makes attempting an attack not rational for
an intruder. In the second case, the equilibrium patrolling strategy is a set
of probabilities for moving between different positions that, when followed
by the patrolling robots, maximizes its expected utility. Both the algorithms
have been analytically studied and experimentally validated to assess their
properties and efficiency.
Several avenues for future work have been outlined in Section 5. Some
preliminary work has been started along a number of these directions, but
most problems remain open. In addition, a fundamental aspect that is being
addressed is the application of the theoretical framework presented in this
paper to real robots [17, 48] and, more generally, the throwing of a bridge
between studies of patrolling in the mobile robot community and those in
the theoretical community.
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